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Abstract:  Economic  analyses  of  environmental  mitigation  and  other  interdisciplinary 
public  policy  issues  can  be  much  more  useful  if  they  critically  examine  what  other 
disciplines  have  to  say,  insist  on  using  the  most  relevant  observational  data  and  the 
scientific  method,  and  examine  lower  cost  alternatives  to  the  change  proposed.  These 
general principles are illustrated by applying them to the case of climate change mitigation, 
one of the most interdisciplinary of public policy issues. The analysis shows how use of 
these  principles  leads  to  quite  different  conclusions  than  those  of  most  previous  such 
economic analyses, as follows:  
 The economic benefits of reducing CO2 emissions may be about two orders of magnitude 
less than those estimated by most economists because the climate sensitivity factor (CSF) 
is much lower than assumed by the United Nations because feedback is negative rather 
than positive and the effects of CO2 emissions reductions on atmospheric CO2 appear to be 
short rather than long lasting.  
 The costs of CO2 emissions reductions are very much higher than usually estimated 
because of technological and implementation problems recently identified. 
 Geoengineering such as solar radiation management is a controversial alternative to CO2 
emissions reductions that offers opportunities to greatly decrease these large costs, change 
global temperatures with far greater assurance of success, and eliminate the possibility of 
low  probability,  high  consequence  risks  of  rising  temperatures,  but  has  been  largely 
ignored by economists.  
 CO2 emissions reductions are economically unattractive since the very modest benefits 
remaining after the corrections for the above effects are quite unlikely to economically 
justify the much higher costs unless much lower cost geoengineering is used.  
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 The risk of catastrophic anthropogenic global warming appears to be so low that it is not 
currently worth doing anything to try to control it, including geoengineering. 
Keywords:  environmental  economics;  climate  change;  economic  benefits;  costs; 
multidisciplinary; scientific method  
 
List of Acronyms 
AMO  Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation 
AR4  Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC published in 2007 
CAGW  Catastrophic AnthropogenicGlobal Warming 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
CSF  Climate Sensitivity Factor 
°C   Degrees Centigrade 

13C 
Isotopic ratio of 
13C to 
12C defined as the standard-normalized difference from the Pee 
Dee Belemnite (PDB) standard 
ENSO  El Niñ o Southern Oscillation 
ERD  Exclusive Regulatory Decarbonization 
EU  European Union 
GCM  General Circulation Model 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GWP  Global World Output 
GHG  Greenhouse Gas 
IPCC  (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
MER  Market Exchange Rates 
PDO  Pacific Decadal Oscillation 
RCIO  Carbon Intensity of Output 
RT  Residence Time 
SRM  Solar Radiation Management 
TSI  Total Solar Irradiance 
US  United States 
US$  United States dollar 
UN  United Nations  
1. Introduction 
With the development of stated preference, travel cost, benefits transfer, and other techniques that 
do not require a full understanding of the physical science aspects of valuing environmental benefits, 
environmental economics  has tended to  pay less attention to these aspects.  But this  tendency has 
brought some problems as well as some benefits for environmental economists. These problems are 
particularly important in the case of economic analyses of multidisciplinary problems such as climate 
change. Economic analyses of environmental mitigation and other public policy issues can be much 
more useful if they critically examine what other disciplines have to say, insist on using the most 
relevant  observational  data  and  the  scientific  method,  and  examine  lower  cost  alternatives  to  the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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change proposed. These general principles are illustrated by applying them to the case of climate 
change mitigation, one of the most interdisciplinary of public policy issues, and showing how they 
lead to quite different conclusions than those of most previous such economic analyses. This seems 
likely to be the case for other interdisciplinary public policy issues besides climate change. 
There is little doubt that proposals to mitigate the threat of climate change, sometimes referred to as 
catastrophic anthropogenic climate change (CAGW) or global warming, has presented environmental 
economics with its most important challenge to date in terms of providing useful advice on what if 
anything should be done concerning what is perhaps the major environmental public policy issue of 
the last decade or more. The economic implications of some prominent proposals to control climate 
change are large. There is currently probably no public policy issue with greater economic impact on 
which environmental economists might have particular expertise and therefore something useful to say. 
The purpose of this article is to assess whether these efforts would be more effective if economists 
used these principles. 
This article was initially motivated by personal discussions with two of the principal economic 
analysts on this subject concerning the validity of the physical science inputs that they had used. One 
said that he had never examined the physical science inputs he used from the United Nations (UN) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) efforts since he assumed that they were valid. The 
other said that he believed there should be a division of effort and that since his expertise was not in 
the physical sciences this should be left to experts in this field, which he felt included the UN IPCC. 
1.1. Use of Most Relevant Observational Data and the Scientific Method as the Basis for  
Determining Effects 
This article will assume, I think reasonably, that the criterion for use of an assumption or hypothesis 
is whether it is supported by relevant observational tests or by the use of the scientific method. If the 
assumption or hypothesis is not so supported, this means that it is not supported by real world data 
since the role of relevant observational tests and the scientific method is to make sure that assumptions 
and  hypotheses  actually  correspond  with  reality.  Under  this  approach,  assertions  of  alleged  facts, 
model claims, and questionable arguments (such as that the authors cannot think of any alternative 
explanations for their conclusions) are not considered. This differs substantially from much previous 
physical science and economic research on climate change, but for good reason. 
It  is  important  that  environmental  economics  be  based  on  valid  science  and  not  conjecture  or 
religious belief if it is to be a reliable guide for policy making. There is no other way to lay a firm 
foundation for environmental economics so it corresponds to the real world rather than the current 
fashions of the day. 
According to my definition of valid science in Section 1.2, it is important for economists to try to 
clearly  identify  those  physical  science  conclusions  they  are  using  that  are  supported  by  specific 
observational tests and the application of the scientific method and which are not. Those not supported 
by observable real world data or the scientific method are best identified as hypothetical calculations in 
my view so as not to be confused with scientific conclusions. Although such hypothetical analyses can 
play an important role in some cases, they need to be carefully distinguished from conclusions of more 
general applicability. This includes conclusions endorsed by national academies of science, scientific Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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societies, peer reviewers, model outputs, or governmental organizations. Hypothetical effects can be 
often be usefully in analyzed, of course, but it is vital if economists are to present credible advice to 
policy makers that any conclusions reached using such assumptions and hypotheses be clearly labeled 
as being not verified scientifically so that the user keeps these qualifications in mind when using the 
conclusions  resulting  from  their  use.  A  similar  approach  is  needed  in  those  cases  where  there  is 
insufficient evidence to determine whether assumptions or hypotheses represent valid science.  
1.2. Why Science Should Be Based on Relevant Observational Data and the Scientific Method 
It is very important to understand what valid science is. Valid science as used here is the result of 
using the most relevant observational data and the scientific method to understand the world and its 
inhabitants. The most relevant goal needs to take into account the reliability of the observational data. 
The essential elements of the scientific method are characterizing the subject of inquiry, generating a 
theoretical,  hypothetical  explanation  for  the  characterizations,  making  predictions  based  on  the 
hypothesis, and finally experimentally determining the validity of these predictions by comparisons 
between the predictions and real world data. The determination of validity needs to be reproducible 
and independently verifiable. The assumptions and hypotheses being tested throughout this paper are 
those found in the various United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) 
reports concerning climate change, reasonable reformulations of those found there, or interpretations 
of them by economists preparing benefit estimates.  
Valid science is not writing a description of the world or the opinions of world authorities on a 
particular subject. Valid science is not a statement of belief by scientific organizations. The question is 
not what someone believes but whether what he or she believes corresponds to the most relevant 
observational data and the scientific method. It is important to note that science evolves over time as 
new discoveries are made and new hypotheses are formulated and discarded. Only continuing research 
can insure that important new research results become available. Richard Feynman [1] expressed this 
as follows:  
―In general, we look for a new law by the following process. First, we guess it. Then we 
compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we 
guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment 
or experience; compare it directly with observation to see if it works. If it disagrees with 
experiment it is wrong. It‘s that simple statement that is the key to science. It does not 
make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how 
smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is—if it disagrees with experiment 
(observation) it is wrong.‖  
According to the scientific method, a scientific hypothesis should be tested by comparing real world 
data with the implications of the hypothesis. This is how Albert Einstein‘s ideas on relativity were 
ultimately accepted. Many scientists doubted his hypothesis, and repeatedly proposed real world tests 
of it. But each test confirmed its validity or was shown to be based on faulty data or analysis. After a 
number of these tests, the opposition conceded that his hypothesis was valid. This process is described 
in Crelinsten [2]. The same process is needed in the case of climate change hypotheses.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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There are alternative approaches that have been proposed to the use of the scientific method for 
determining  scientific  validity.  An  example  is  that  proposed  by  Armstrong  and  Green  [3].  Their 
broader approach includes many of the attributes of using the scientific method outlined above, and 
reaches the same conclusion as this study does as to the validity (or lack thereof) of much current 
research on climate change, but places somewhat less emphasis on the use of observational data and 
the validity of hypotheses.  
1.2.1. Why Computer Models Do Not Demonstrate Scientific Validity 
CAGW  supporters  often  claim  that  the  results  of  climate  models  validate  their  conclusions 
scientifically. Although these climate general circulation models (GCMs) have many uses in scientific 
inquiry, they do not prove or disprove scientific validity. Models show what the model builders believe 
is  the  way  some  physical  system,  in  this  case  climate,  works.  But  all  that  they  represent  
(at best) is the model builders‘ beliefs and judgments. Models produce scenarios, not forecasts [3], and 
neither prove nor disprove scientific hypotheses nor show what will happen in the future. The only 
way to do this is by comparison of particular scientific hypotheses with real world data other than past 
temperature data, which the models have usually been modified to emulate. The particular climate 
models used by the UN IPCC appear to be even more questionable than many since they do not even 
do a good job of hindsight [4], let alone foresight. 
1.2.2. Uncertainties in the Scientific Data Used for Rejecting a Hypothesis 
Although the principle of using the most relevant observational data and the scientific method as 
outlined above for deciding what is and is not valid science and hence what should and should not be 
used  in  economic  analyses  appears  inescapable,  its  application  to  particular  issues  is  often  more 
difficult. There will inevitably be questions about whether the correct comparisons have been made 
between the hypotheses to be tested and the real world data used to test them, or whether the best data 
have been used to make the comparisons, or whether there even is valid, unmanipulated, and adequate 
quality data that can reasonably be used for such comparisons, or whether the most recent research 
results have been used, or what constitutes research results that should be used. 
In my view there is no such thing as settled science because settled science is not science. After a 
scientific hypothesis has undergone many comparisons with real world data it may gradually assume 
the status of a physical law. But short of such laws, and in some cases even in their case, science only 
advances by constantly questioning all aspects of any hypothesis. So although I will attempt to use 
what I consider to be the most valid science available to me at the time this is written, and am willing 
to defend my judgments as such, future research may result in either further evidence confirming my 
judgments or even refuting them. If the risk of such changes is high and the cost of undertaking a 
policy change is high, the best approach is normally to do nothing until either the science becomes 
more settled or the costs come down. It should be the responsibility of those proposing a public policy 
change to make the case in this respect, not those opposed to making the change.  
An important footnote here is that valid science as used here is determined by whether it is based on 
the  most  relevant  observational  tests  and  the  scientific  method,  not  by  whether  it  has  or  has  not 
appeared in a peer-reviewed journal. Peer-review may play an important role in determining which Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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articles are published, but does not guarantee that the assumptions and hypotheses used represent valid 
science since the primary requirement for successful peer review is that other experts agree with the 
author. Particularly if enough experts agree on one particular viewpoint or if experts who do not agree 
are excluded from the peer review, peer-review does not guarantee scientific validity, the primary 
criterion used in this article. 
Unfortunately, the only useful way to deal with the inevitable application uncertainties is on a  
case-by-case basis. General rules such as only peer-reviewed, published research should be judged as 
valid  may  simplify  decision-making,  but  impose  substantial  costs  in  terms  of  delays  and  the 
discouragement of new ideas, and in no way guarantee that all such research represents valid science. 
In the end, reasonable judgments have to be made. Much as economists might like to avoid these 
―scientific‖  issues  or  may  even  feel  unsuited  to  judge  them,  economists  run  the  risk  of  grossly 
misleading their readers if they fail to deal with the major scientific (as well as economic) uncertainties 
and their economic implications. Where these uncertainties are very large, a reasonable conclusion 
may be that detailed benefit-cost analysis cannot play a useful role. But in most cases a careful analysis 
of the major scientific uncertainties will avoid the most serious risks of misinforming readers. At the 
very  least,  the  approach  used  here  provides  a  framework  for  deciding  which  physical  science 
assumptions and hypotheses to accept and which to reject. This general approach has too often been 
lacking in discussions of climate change issues by economists as well as non-economists. In all too 
many cases these discussions have centered on prejudicial denigration of what the opposition is saying 
or the motives of the individuals saying it. It is only by using the most relevant observationally derived 
data  and  applying  the  scientific  method  that  progress  can  be  made  on  this  and  many  other 
environmental  and  public  policy  interdisciplinary  issues  involving  the  physical  sciences.  The 
discussion  should  be  centered  on  what  the  most  relevant  evidence  shows,  not  who  is  making  
the argument. 
This paper can be viewed primarily as an attempt to apply the most relevant observational data and 
the scientific method to determine whether a few of the most economically critical assumptions and 
hypotheses are scientifically valid in the climate change case and what the economic implications of 
using other, more valid assumptions and hypotheses would be. Secondarily, it examines what the 
effects of ignoring lower cost mitigation alternatives are. As such, it has important methodological 
implications even if readers should disagree with the judgments reached as to the validity of some of 
the physical science assumptions and hypotheses central to the debate or with the validity of using 
lower cost alternatives. Some may argue that physical science decisions should be left to physical 
scientists and that economists should not get involved in the physical science aspects of policy choices 
they are evaluating; I argue, on the contrary, that there is no escape from making such judgments since 
using the scientific judgments of one side in a scientific argument assumes that that side is valid and 
the opposition side is invalid. The result is that the casual reader may not even realize that there is a 
difference of opinion and what effects that difference has on the economic analysis. All this will be 
illustrated  by  the  case  of  climate  change  mitigation.  Even  if  the  reader  should  disagree  with  the 
particular judgments made in this article concerning the scientific validity or invalidity of various 
assumptions  and  hypotheses,  I  believe  I  have  at  least  demonstrated  the  importance  of  explicitly 
explaining  the  effects  of  the  major  scientific  uncertainties  in  any  economic  analysis  with  major 
interdisciplinary characteristics such as climate change mitigation. At the very least, I believe this Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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study shows that the outcomes of economic analyses of the climate change mitigation are critically 
sensitive  to  a  number  of  scientific  judgments  which  need  to  be  very  carefully  examined  for  
scientific validity. 
1.2.3. Some Assumptions 
This article will assume that most of the economists who have attempted to value the economic 
benefits of climate change remediation have directly or indirectly tried to use the then most recent 
version of the IPCC assessment reports as their guide to the science. Some may have been more or less 
successful in doing so, of course. But in order to make some more general points with regard to how 
economic analyses of such hypotheses might best be carried out, there is no other easy way to do so 
other than by making this assumption; further, this seems to be the underlying unifying assumption of 
all the previous analyses discussed in this article. Thus by questioning a particular aspect of the IPCC‘s 
analyses, it is assumed that all of the economic analyses are questioned in this respect. Each economic 
analysis is different in what it computes the benefits will be, what discount rate is used, etc., but most 
appear to strive towards using IPCC science in determining what the economic benefits of climate 
change mitigation might be as it was known at the time the analysis was done. 
1.3. Why Economists Also Have a Responsibility to Consider the Lowest Cost Alternative  
In doing benefit-cost analysis economists can usually select from a variety of alternative ways to 
achieve the benefits being valued. If they select a higher cost alternative for their analysis, they are 
putting the action being valued at a disadvantage relative to using the lowest cost alternative. So 
although the action might be economically efficient using the lowest cost alternative, it might not be 
using  the  higher  cost  alternative.  In  any  case  it  would  be  more  efficient  using  the  lowest  cost 
alternative. I will take the viewpoint that economists would be able to make a more useful policy 
contribution by pointing out whether lower cost alternatives exist so that users can determine what the 
meaning of the conclusions reached might be in terms of all the options available. Some of these 
alternatives may have unquantifiable disadvantages compared to higher cost alternatives, but this needs 
to be pointed out so that policy analysis users can select the best possible option rather than simply 
ignoring or not discussing these lower cost alternatives as too often happens, particularly in the case of 
climate change. 
1.4. Outline of the Article 
Section 2 will discuss what the economic benefits are of the major solution offered by CAGW 
proponents for mitigating climate change, namely reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
into the air as a result of human activities. Section 3 will discuss several major problems with previous 
determinations of economic costs. Section 4 discusses how these changes affect benefit-cost analyses 
of the problem. Section 5 will provide selected comparisons between the conclusions reached in this 
paper with those of other economists. Section 6 will summarize the major conclusions from the paper.  
 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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2. The Economic Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation 
2.1. The Background 
Beginning in the 1980s, the United Nations attempted to determine the extent to which global 
warming may be due to human activities in a series of reports prepared by its IPCC. The most recent of 
these was issued in 2007 and is usually referred to as the AR4 report [5]. It is important to note that the 
IPCC‘s charge is not to determine what causes global warming but rather whether it results  from 
human  activities.  They  have  orchestrated  worldwide  concern  about  global  warming  with  strong 
support from many Western governments, some academics, and most environmental organizations. 
They concluded that this warming could be mitigated by reducing human emissions of greenhouse 
gases, particularly carbon dioxide (CO2). One of the immediate questions was what the economic 
benefits  of  such  reductions  might  be.  There  have  been  numerous  attempts  to  determine  this  by 
economists, ranging from the technically sophisticated to the more easily understood by the public (see 
Section 5 below for a list of many of these). 
In  all  major  cases  I  know  of  those  preparing  the  benefit  estimates  assumed  that  the  IPCC 
conclusions concerning the effects of decreasing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions 
were substantially correct and accurate. It is not clear why they all assumed this, however, since as will 
be shown for particular instances later in this section, key conclusions reached by the IPCC are not 
supported by the most relevant observational tests and the scientific method (see Section 1.2 above for 
a discussion of the scientific method and its role in determining what is valid science), and therefore 
have no standing as science despite numerous statements to the contrary by CAGW supporters. Idso 
and Singer [6] have compiled an extensive listing of many of these problems. 
The IPCC‘s timing was excellent since in fact Earth appears to have been in a minor periodic 
warming period according to ground-based measurements. This minor warming started in the late 
1970s  and  may  have  peaked  in  1998,  and  followed  a  much  longer  standing  even  more  gradual 
warming that has taken place since the end of the Little Ice Age. A gross generalization is that the 
IPCC models effectively hypothesized that this minor periodic warming would continue during the 
21st century even though similar periodic warming and cooling has been going on since at least the 
late 19th century and probably for much longer. Although it is not clear whether humans as a whole 
would  on  balance  be  better  or  worse  off  as  a  result  of  the  presumed  rise  in  global  temperatures 
hypothesized by the IPCC, the CAGW promoters managed to sell a major scare to a surprising number 
of people and government officials through a variety of means. Their views have even been endorsed 
by most of the national academies of science around the world. Major Western European nations and 
the European Union enacted significant legislation that would reduce the global warming, or so it was 
claimed. The United States House of Representatives passed related legislation [7] in 2009, but it was 
not passed by the Senate and died at the end of the 111th Congress in 2010.  
The various UN IPCC reports broadly argue that the authors cannot think of any reasonable source 
of global warming other than the increasing level of some GHGs, so that must be the cause. There are 
a  few  exceptions,  such  as  large  volcanic  eruptions,  which  they  agree  may  influence  global 
temperatures, but they do not believe that the warming can be attributed to most other natural causes Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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such as solar or cloud cover variability, which they view as being of minor or little importance in 
influencing climate.  
A much more logical and plausible set of CAGW hypotheses might be as follows:  
Hypothesis  1:  Anthropogenic  releases  of  CO2  are  the  primary  cause  of  increases  in 
atmospheric CO2. 
Hypothesis 2: Increases in atmospheric CO2 levels interact with the major greenhouse gas, 
water  vapor,  to  create  a  large  positive  feedback  capable  of  creating  catastrophic  
global warming. 
If these two hypotheses were correct, then it might follow that: 
Hypothesis 3: Anthropogenic GHG emissions, particularly CO2, will result in CAGW. 
This  appears  to  be  the  primary  hypothesis  offered  by  climate  change  mitigation  promoters. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to determine the validity of this statement with current knowledge 
other than to examine hypotheses 1 and 2 separately. But a related but still important hypothesis that 
can be examined is the following: 
Hypothesis 3a: Changes in global temperatures are primarily influenced by rising levels of 
GHGs other than water vapor in the atmosphere.  
Most of the remainder of this section will discuss these hypotheses using a variety of sources. The 
emphasis will be on a few of the scientific issues, which have a major influence on the economic 
analysis of climate mitigation since economic analysis is the focus of this paper. There are many 
scientific issues that this article will not discuss because of the time and space that would be required. 
It is possible, of course, that some of these other issues, if analyzed in the same depth, would result in 
offsetting  the  effects  of those discussed.  Given the history of the UN IPCC, however,  which has 
consistently emphasized the adverse effects of increasing CO2 in the atmosphere, this possibility is not 
very likely. 
2.2. Hypothesis 1: Anthropogenic Releases of CO2 Are the Primary Cause of Increases in  
Atmospheric CO2 
There  have  been  slow  but  fairly  steady  increases  in  CO2  levels  in  the  atmosphere  since 
measurements began on Mauna Loa in Hawaii in the mid-1950s based on measurements there. Some 
have argued that these increases are primarily a result of emissions from burning fossil fuels; others 
believe it is due to natural causes. The IPCC claims that 21 percent of atmospheric CO2 is from burning 
fossil  fuels  [8],  and  that  CO2  may  remain  in  the  atmosphere  for  a  long  period,  with  a  ―rough 
indication‖ of 50 to 250 years, as discussed in the next paragraph. The atmospheric residence time  
(or RT) is less than clearly stated in the various IPCC reports, but a recent article [9] whose lead author 
was  the  Co-chair  of  the  IPCC  Working  Group  1  (concerning  physical  sciences)  claims  that  CO2 
remains in the atmosphere almost indefinitely. The issue of how long CO2 emissions remain in the 
atmosphere has become even more confusing because global warming supporters have coined a variety 
of terms related to the residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere besides the simple residence time, 
equal to the average time that molecules remain in the atmosphere.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Segalstad reports [10] as follows (with reference number added): 
―[The] IPCC defines lifetime for CO2 as the time required for the atmosphere to adjust to a 
future equilibrium state if emissions change abruptly, and gives a lifetime of 50–200 years in 
parentheses (Houghton et al., 1990) [11]. Their footnote No. 4 to their Table 1.1 explains: 
For each gas in the table, except CO2, the "lifetime" is defined here as the ratio of the 
atmospheric content to the total rate of removal. This time scale also characterizes the rate 
of adjustment of the atmospheric concentrations if the emission rates are changed abruptly. 
CO2 is a special case since it has no real sinks, but is merely circulated between various 
reservoirs (atmosphere, ocean, biota). The "lifetime" of CO2 given in the table is a rough 
indication of the time it would take for the CO2 concentration to adjust to changes in the 
emissions…” 
Segalstad [12] argues  ―the  IPCC has  constructed an  artificial model where they claim that  the 
natural CO2 input/output is in static balance, and that all CO2 additions from anthropogenic carbon 
combustion being added to the atmospheric pool will stay there almost indefinitely.‖ In this regard, the 
IPCC and its supporters have sometimes tried to support their case by arguing, sometimes with models, 
that  CO2  once  emitted will stay around  for quite  some  time  in  one  reservoir or another and will 
continue to pass between reservoirs until it is ultimately transported into ocean sediments. They have 
sometimes argued that it will take many years for the system to fully return to pre-industrial levels. 
Although  this  is  probably  true,  the  immediate  question  from  an  economic  and  environmental 
standpoint is the average residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere since that is the only CO2 reservoir 
where it may impact the greenhouse effect. It is possible that CO2 emissions might have adverse 
effects in other reservoirs, of course, but this is highly unlikely in that it represents food for plants and 
in  Segalstad‘s  view  there  are  extremely  large,  multiple  buffering  systems  found  in  the  oceanic 
reservoir  [8].  But  it  is  the  atmospheric  reservoir  that  is  being  discussed  here.  Accordingly,  the 
atmospheric  residence  time  used  here  is  based  only  on  measurements  of  the  air  reservoir.  The 
residence time measured by Segalstad [8,10] appears to fit that description. The relevant issue, of 
course, is what assumptions the models the IPCC and economists actually used were. 
There are three different carbon isotopes, carbon 12, 13, and 14, usually denoted as 
12C, 
13C, and 
14C. An important characteristic of plants is that they prefer to use CO2 with lighter carbon isotopes, 
namely, 
12C. Hence there is a difference in the isotopic composition of CO2 derived from plants living 
or dead compared to other sources (such as volcanic activity), and therefore in the fossil fuels derived 
from these plants, and in the CO2 produced by burning them in one form or another. Specifically, 
carbon in plants has a lower 
13C/
12C ratio. When fossil fuels are burned carbon from the ancient plants 
from  which  the  fuels  were  formed  is  released  as  CO2  into  and  mixes  with  the  atmosphere,  thus 
lowering the 
13C/
12C ratio there. By measuring the isotopic composition of CO2 in the atmosphere it is 
possible to estimate the percentage of CO2 derived from plants and to infer the residence time of CO2 
in the atmosphere. Most but not all anthropogenic CO2 emissions come from burning fossil fuels. 
The question at hand is whether these measurements correspond to the IPCC assumptions in this 
regard. If not, there would appear to be something of great importance wrong with their assumptions or 
hypotheses.  The  short  answer  to  this  question  is  that  the  isotopic  CO2  analysis  presented  by  
Segalstad  [8,10]  are  not  consistent  with  the  IPCC  assumptions  in  several  important  regards,  and Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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therefore  these  IPCC  assumptions  are  not  scientifically  valid  assuming  that  Segalstad‘s  data  and 
analyses of them are correct.  
13C/
12C isotope ratios are usually  expressed as 
13C values, defined as the standard-normalized 
difference from the Pee Dee Belemnite (PDB) standard and calculated as follows [13]:  
 Sample
13C  =  ) 1
/
/
( 12 13
12 13

PDB
sample
C C
C C
 1000 
This value is expressed in parts per thousand or per mil (―0/00‖). 
Using an isotopic mass balance analysis, Segalstad [8,10] finds that CO2 from burning fossil fuel 
constitutes only at most 4 percent of atmospheric CO2 and that the RT for CO2 in the atmosphere is 
only a little over 5 years. Essenhigh‘s research [14] supports some of these findings according to 
Segalstad [12], who describes his methodology as follows [15]: 
―The  December  1988  atmospheric  CO2
 composition  was  computed  for  its  748  GT  C  
(GT  =  10
15 
g)  total  mass  and  
13C  =  –7.807  for  3  components:  (1)  natural  fraction 
remaining from the pre-industrial atmosphere; (2) cumulative fraction remaining from all 
annual fossil-fuel CO2
 emissions; (3) carbon isotope mass-balanced natural fraction. The 
masses  of  component  (1)  and  (2)  were  computed  for  different  atmospheric  lifetimes  
of CO2.‖  
A more recent reference is [16]. 
Slide  19 of  [8],  which  Segalstad entitles  ―Proof  from Isotopic  Mass Balance,‖  summarizes his 
results. His slide relates atmospheric CO2 lifetime to atmospheric CO2 mass in the atmosphere by the 
three components listed above by him. In his Slide 18 Segalstad [8] presents data showing that the 
expected 
13C value, if 21 percent of atmospheric CO2 comes from burning fossil fuels and CO2 has a 
long lifetime in the atmosphere, would be −11, which he points out is inconsistent with the real world 
measurements shown in his Slide 19 [8] of −7.807 in December, 1988 as well as in [17]. This is an 
example of a prediction based on IPCC findings/assumptions that does not correspond to a real world 
observation, assuming that Segalstad‘s data and analysis are correct. Finally, Segalstad‘s Slide 20  
in [8] shows that the CO2 from fossil fuel sources constitutes less than 4 percent of total atmospheric 
CO2, rather than the 21 percent used by the IPCC [8].  
Segalstad‘s findings are bolstered by several other real world observations. One is that climate 
researchers have long been mystified by the fact that the Mauna Loa CO2 measurements can only 
account for about half of the anthropogenic emissions (as shown in Figure 1), so they have long sought 
a  ―missing  sink‖  for  CO2.  Interestingly  enough,  Segalstad‘s  analysis  shows  why  this  may  have 
occurred, as shown in his slide 21 of [8], where RTs in the range of 50 to 200 years would result in 
about half the mass of CO2 in the atmosphere, as shown by the red circle in his Slide 21, which is 
remarkably consistent with the ―missing sink‖ that many researchers have looked for in vain. The 
existence of this problem is another failed prediction of the IPCC hypotheses. The other finding is that 
dozens of researchers using a variety of techniques have found RTs that are roughly consistent with the 
5–6 year time frame, as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure  1.  Measured  Mauna  Loa  CO2  measurements  showing  50%  error  versus  the 
cumulative expected CO2 level from burning fossil fuels. Source: [8], Slide 14. 
 
Figure 2. Effective lifetime for CO2 in the atmosphere based on a variety of methods. 
Source: Sundquist [18] and Segalstad [10], as presented in [8], Slide 23.  
Effective atmospheric CO2 lifetime
The effective lifetime for CO2 in the 
atmosphere, can be determined by 
the help of radioactive, radiogenic, 
and stable isotopes.
All measurements with 
different methods show short 
effective lifetimes for 
atmospheric CO2, only ca.
5 - 6 years.
Sundquist (1985); Segalstad (1998)
 
The significance of Segalstad‘s findings cannot be overestimated assuming his data and analysis are 
correct. Four percent of atmospheric CO2 is in the noise level and contrasts sharply with the IPCC‘s  
21 percent estimate. The 5+ years RT explains why four percent is reasonable and also contrasts 
greatly with the IPCC‘s apparent assumptions. Segalstad‘s findings cast great doubt on some of the 
most  important  IPCC  assumptions  concerning CO2  (as  noted  by  Segalstad  [8])  as  well  as  on  the 
indirect assumptions made by most if not all economists who have attempted to value the economic 
benefits of CO2 emissions control. Among many other observations, Segalstad points out that a RT of 
5 years implies that about 135 GT C is exchanged out of the atmosphere each year. ―This is far more Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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than the ~7 GT C annually released from fossil fuel burning‖ [8]. Further, ―anthropogenic CO2 is less 
than ½ W/m
2, less than 0.1 percent, judged from C isotopes. Clouds are a real thermostat, with far 
more temperature regulating power than CO2‖ [8]. He does not mention it, but it appears widely agreed 
that the atmospheric models used by the IPCC do not handle clouds very well. 
An important point here is that water can absorb less CO2 as temperatures rise. So an alternative 
explanation to the IPCC hypothesis that the observed rise in atmospheric CO2 is due to anthropogenic 
emissions is that ocean temperatures have at some time in the past warmed enough so that some of its 
CO2 is now being out gassed.  
The issue of CO2 residence times in the atmosphere is of great importance to economic analyses of 
the benefits of climate mitigation since it determines the period of time during which the economic 
benefits of emissions reductions would take place. Short atmospheric residence times would mean that 
the  economic  benefits  of  emissions  reductions  would  occur  over  a  much  shorter  period  than  if 
residence times were very long. The greenhouse effect of added CO2 in the natural world is only 
effective when the CO2 is in the atmosphere, not when it is in plants or the oceans, or in ocean 
sediments. Added CO2 (or the carbon in it) in plants or oceans may have important effects, of course, 
but not for the greenhouse effect on global temperatures. The economic implications of this will be 
spelled out in more detail in Section 2.6.1 below. 
The  observed  increasing  atmospheric  CO2  levels  may  be  primarily  due  to  increasing  ocean 
temperatures hundreds of years ago since water cannot absorb as much CO2 at higher temperatures. In 
other words, the CAGW supporters may have reversed cause and effect. Instead of increases in CO2 
causing rising temperatures, rising temperatures result in higher CO2 in the atmosphere, probably with 
a time lag. It is not known exactly what the lag time might be for changes in water temperatures to 
result in increases or decreases in out gassing from or absorption of CO2 by the oceans. Research 
shows, however, that at the bottom of an ice age 250 thousand years ago CO2 increased with about an 
800 year lag after temperatures increased [19]. So the current increases in CO2 levels might be due to 
increases in temperatures 800 years ago or could be a result of anthropogenic emissions. Or since 
much of Earth‘s CO2 appears to be derived from and vary with changes in volcanic activity [8], this 
may be another possibility. 
In sum, there appears to be substantial evidence that CO2 residence times in the atmosphere are 
about  5  years,  that  only  a  small  percentage  of  CO2  from  fossil  fuel  sources  can  be  found  in  the 
atmosphere, that there are alternative natural explanations for rising CO2 levels, and that there is little 
reason to think that CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning are likely to be a significant cause of the 
gradually increasing atmospheric CO2 levels. 
2.3. Hypothesis 2: Increases in Atmospheric CO2 Levels Interact with the Major Greenhouse Gas, 
Water Vapor, to Create a Large Positive Feedback Capable of Causing Catastrophic Global Warming 
Undoubtedly  the  most  controversial  of  the  hypotheses  underlying  the  UN‘s  conclusions  is  the 
question of feedback. The IPCC and all the computer models it uses assume that there is a strong 
positive feedback between an increase in trace greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (such as CO2) and 
the major greenhouse gas (water vapor). Without this strong feedback there is no real basis for CAGW 
since the atmosphere contains only trace amounts of other greenhouse gases besides water vapor, and Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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the climate sensitivity factor (CSF) for the effect of doubling CO2 on global temperatures alone is 
widely believed to be small (as discussed below and in Section 2.3.1.4). More than 90 percent of the 
greenhouse effect is due to water vapor and is significantly affected by the extent of cloud cover; CO2 
from fossil fuel burning does increase the atmospheric CO2 level slightly, but represents less than  
0.1 percent of the greenhouse effect (as illustrated in Figure 3) according in Segalstad [8].  
Figure 3. Major role of water vapor and very minor role of CO2 in the greenhouse effect. 
Source: [8], Slide 18. 
 
Archibald [20] points out that ―the effect of carbon dioxide on temperature is logarithmic and thus 
climate sensitivity decreases with increasing concentration,‖ so that further increases in atmospheric 
CO2 would have very little effect on global temperatures. Further, he finds that: 
―The  first  20  ppm  of  carbon  dioxide  has  a  greater  temperature  effect  than  the  next  
400 ppm. The rate of annual increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide over the last 30 years 
has averaged 1.7 ppm. From the current level of 380 ppm, it is projected to rise to 420 ppm 
by 2030.  
―The projected 40 ppm increase reduces emission from the stratosphere to space…This… 
equates to an increase in atmospheric temperature of 0.04 ° C.  
―Increasing the carbon dioxide content by a further 200 ppm to 620 ppm, projected by 
2150, results in a further 0.16 ° C increase in atmospheric temperature.  
―Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, increased atmospheric carbon dioxide 
has increased the temperature of the atmosphere by 0.1 °C .‖  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Figure 4 is a schematic of how this feedback might take place to amplify the effects of increasing 
atmospheric CO2 levels. By assuming a strong feedback, the IPCC AR4 report [5] and the models it 
uses  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  climate  sensitivity  factor  (CSF)  relating  the  increase  in  global 
temperatures (in degrees centigrade) to a doubling in the level of atmospheric CO2 is between 2 and 
4.5
 ° C with a best estimate of 3
 ° C. By using the IPCC or related model results, economists have 
implicitly used these estimates in determining the benefits of CO2 emissions mitigation. Now the major 
scientific issue is whether this hypothesis that there is strong feedback is supported by the scientific 
method on the basis of real world data.  
Figure 4. Schematic explanation for possible feedback effects. Source: Lindzen [21]. 
 
 
2.3.1. Four Critical Comparisons with Real World Data 
There are at least four particularly telling physically-based basic comparisons which can be made to 
determine the scientific validity of the UN strong feedback hypothesis. According to the scientific 
method  an  inconsistency  even  in  one  of  these  comparisons  means  that  the  hypothesis  should  be 
rejected from a scientific viewpoint. In order to determine this it is necessary to compare the physical 
effects of the assumed strong feedback with actual real world data.  
The CAGW concerns are based on a hypothesis that there are significantly positive feedbacks from 
the effects of the CO2 increase on water vapor and clouds that would greatly amplify the greenhouse 
effect of the increase in CO2. This is the key hypothesis which can be compared with real world data to 
determine  whether  the  IPCC  findings  are  valid  or  not.  Although  there  are  other  tests  (see  [22],  
Slide  44),  hypothesis  2  requires  that  each  of  the  following  four  observations  discussed  in  this 
subsection are present: Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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1. The atmospheric response times for volcanic sequences would be longer than they would 
be without the UN‘s high positive feedback hypothesis. 
2. There is a tropical hot spot in the upper troposphere. 
3. There is a heating of the oceans. 
4.  Observed  outgoing  radiation  fluxes  from  the  earth  decrease  with  increases  in  sea  
surface temperatures. 
Each  of  these  tests  will  be  discussed  in  turn,  with  those  depending  on  the  most  recent  data  
discussed last. 
2.3.1.1. The Atmospheric Response Times for Volcanic Sequences Would Be Longer than They 
Would Be without the UN‘s Strong Positive Feedback Hypothesis 
If climate sensitivity is as high as the UN claims, it should show up in the atmosphere‘s response 
time to volcanic eruptions. The reason for this is that climate sensitivity is also a measure of how 
tightly  air  and  sea  temperatures  are  coupled.  High  sensitivity  is  associated  with  weak  coupling, 
allowing the establishment of significant disequilibration of the sea surface temperature. To quote 
Lindzen‘s Slide 45 [22]:  
―Another line of inquiry involved noting that the time for the ocean to respond to a change 
in forcing increased as climate sensitivity increases. This may seem counter-intuitive, but 
the idea is simple. Sensitivity is essentially a ratio of a change in temperature to a change in 
energy flux. High sensitivity means that a change in temperature is accompanied by a small 
change in flux. However, a small flux takes longer to change the temperature of the ocean. 
In any event in papers published in 1994 and 1998, we noted that in sensitive climates, a 
sequence of volcanoes would lead to a secular cooling, but in an insensitive climate, the 
volcanoes would simply produce transient 1–2 year dips in temperature. The record seems 
to favor the dips.‖  
Lindzen provides two references: [23,24]. A 1997 presentation [25] he made at a US National 
Academy  of  Sciences  symposium  clarifies  this  argument  as  follows  with  regard  to  the  volcanic 
sequence between Krakatoa in 1883 and Katmai in 1912: 
―The  results  show  that  for  sensitive  climates  (>0.6
 °C   for  a  doubling  of  CO2),  each 
volcano  builds  on  the  residual  base  of  earlier  volcanoes  leading  to  a  substantial  
long-term cooling (~0.5
 °C  cooling between 1883 and 1912). For low sensitivity, the 
response consists in essentially independent ‗blips.‘ The observed temperature record 
certainly shows nothing more than isolated ‗blips.‘‖ 
2.3.1.2. There Is a Tropical Hot Spot in the Upper Troposphere 
According to Chapter 9 of the IPCC AR4 report [26] all the IPCC climate models predict that there 
should be a hot spot in the upper troposphere about 5–12 km above the Earth‘s surface in the tropics 
caused  by  increased  evaporation  from  warmer  oceans  leading  to  the  accumulation  of  higher 
concentrations of water vapor in the upper troposphere, and thereby generating the critical positive Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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feedback reinforcing the small amount of warming that can be caused by increasing CO2 alone. The 
feedback creates the hotspot and is responsible for much of the temperature rises predicted by the 
IPCC models [27]. If non-water vapor greenhouse gases are significantly warming the Earth, the first 
signs of it are supposed to appear above the tropics. Since no such hotspot has been found, the models 
and therefore the UN‘s hypothesis concerning feedback are wrong [27]. Various efforts have been 
made to argue that those looking for the hot spot might have missed it, but have not claimed to have 
actually found it [28,29]. Sherwood et al. tried to find every possible source of uncertainty in the 
observations in order to argue that agreement with the models was marginally possible. The data are 
based on well established radiosonde technology and hundreds of tests so it quite unlikely that all the 
tests were wrong [27], so this hardly constitutes a convincing argument. Statistical counter-arguments 
to the issues raised by Santer et al. [28] can be found in McIntyre [30]. Sherwood et al. [29] claimed to 
have found the hotspot using a combination of temperature and wind data. Using wind data is an 
example of not using the most relevant observational data since temperature is the issue here. The 
claimed hotspot, however, is much too faint compared to what the IPCC models predict and there is no 
rationale for using wind data in place of temperature data [27] when temperature is what is being 
studied. Lindzen reaches similar conclusions [22] in slide 47. 
This hotspot test is perhaps the best known of the tests of the feedback hypothesis, and has been 
widely written about. One of the most comprehensive and detailed discussions may be Evans [27]. The 
most easily understood non-technical discussion is probably [31]. The failure of the IPCC or others to 
find the hotspot that they agree should be present is sufficient by itself to determine that the IPCC‘s 
feedback hypothesis is incorrect, and that the feedback effects of increasing CO2 are therefore much 
smaller than claimed by the IPCC.  
2.3.1.3. There Is Heating of the Oceans 
The added heat believed by CAGW supporters to be generated by increasing greenhouse gas levels 
in the atmosphere must be stored somewhere. It has not been showing up in the atmosphere in the last 
decade, so if the hypothesis is valid it must be going into the oceans. But sea temperature data from the 
ARGO array for 2003–2008 show no increase, so this has not been the case. An extensive discussion 
of the evidence can be found in DiPuccio [32]. He concludes that:  
―In brief, we know of no mechanism by which vast amounts of ―missing‖ heat can be 
hidden,  transferred,  or  absorbed  within  the  earth‘s  system.  The  only  reasonable 
conclusion—call it a null hypothesis—is that heat is no longer accumulating in the climate 
system and there is no longer a radiative imbalance caused by anthropogenic forcing. This 
not  only  demonstrates  that  the  IPCC  models  are  failing  to  accurately  predict  global 
warming, but also presents a serious challenge to the integrity of the AGW hypothesis.‖ 
Similar  questions  have  been  raised  and  conclusions  reached  by  Roger  Pielke  Sr.  in  [33]  and 
preceding references noted there. Lindzen [22] argues on slide 48, referencing Schwartz [34,35], that 
the rate of change of ocean temperatures shows slightly negative feedback. Hansen and colleagues 
argue [36] that such warming should be occurring. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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So the bottom line is that both sides agree that the oceans should be warming if hypothesis 3 is 
correct, but current evidence is that they are not. So the CAGW feedback hypothesis fails this rather 
straightforward and simple test against real world data as well. 
2.3.1.4. Observed Outgoing Radiation Fluxes from the Earth Decrease with Increases in Sea  
Surface Temperatures 
All the IPCC models show decreases in radiation fluxes leaving Earth with increases in global 
temperature, as might be expected under their greenhouse hypothesis. Satellite data, however, show an 
increase in outgoing radiation, which is inconsistent with the high climate sensitivities to increases in 
CO2 and positive feedback so crucial to the UN‘s case.  
In August, 2009, Lindzen and Choi published a paper [37] which inferred from satellite data that 
feedback is not positive at all. Using observations from the ERBE instrument on the ERBS satellite, 
they analyzed the relationship between tropical sea surface temperatures and top-of-the atmosphere 
heat  radiation.  This  paper  has  been  criticized  by  Trenberth  et  al.  [38].  Lindzen  and  Choi  have 
responded with a revised paper [39] using additional data from the CERES instrument on the Terra 
satellite, but with the same general results. Lindzen and Choi‘s revised paper [39] concludes that the 
satellite data implies a climate sensitivity of 0.7
 °C , as compared to a CSF for CO2 alone of ―about  
1 °C ‖ [21] without any feedback. (In 1997 Lindzen testified [40] that the CO2 only CSF was 1.2 °C .).  
Spencer and Braswell [41], also using observational evidence from satellites, in this case from 
CERES and the AMSR-E instrument on the newer Aqua satellite, also found negative feedback and an 
amazingly similar CSF of only 0.6
 °C . Spencer‘s argument can also be found in [42]. What this means 
is that there is a feedback, but it is negative, not positive as the IPCC maintains. So instead of an 
increase in the CSF due to feedback, which results in the IPCC assumed approximately 3 °C  CSF, 
there is a decrease from the CO2 only value of 1.0 to 1.2 °C  down to 0.6 to 0.7 °C .  
According to Spencer and Braswell [41], the models have misinterpreted cause and effect. They 
believe that it is changes in clouds that cause temperatures changes, not the other way around. Very 
recently, Dessler [43] claims that he has demonstrated that feedback is positive rather than negative. 
Spencer  [44]  has  responded  that  Dessler  missed  his  main  point,  that  when  cloud  changes  cause 
temperature changes it creates the illusion of a positive cloud feedback, but not the actuality. Although 
the Spencer/Dessler debate may not be over at this writing, all the other existing tests described above 
also all argue for a much lower CSF. Although the analyses of the first three do not specify a more 
appropriate number, Spencer/Braswell [41] and Lindzen/Choi [39] are consistent with them and are 
thus very plausible.  
2.3.1.5. Conclusions from the Four Tests 
The conclusions are the same in each of these four cases: The UN feedback hypothesis is not 
supported or even partially supported by these comparisons with real world data. As Lindzen recently 
observed [45] with regard to his findings on comparison 4 above, ―In a normal field, these results 
would  pretty  much  wrap  things  up,  but  global  warming/climate  change  has  developed  so  much 
momentum that it has a life of its own—quite removed from science.‖ Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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The data are far from perfect, of course, perhaps in part because of a lack of effort to gather it. But 
the available evidence based on empirical data (rather than models) tell the same story. This means that 
the hypothesis should be rejected scientifically based on current information. Future testing could lead 
to other conclusions, of course, but for now rejection is the only rational course of action. It is quite 
possible that further research may yield a different conclusion, but as of the time that this is being 
written the evidence strongly supports a negative feedback and a much lower CSF, and this is why a 
much lower CSF will be used in this paper and why I believe it needs to be by other analysts as well. 
The important implications of this change in the CSF for the analysis of the economic benefits of CO2 
emissions reductions will be discussed in Section 2.6.2 below. 
It may be useful to provide some explanation why it is that feedback is negative. One explanation is 
that the IPCC models are not able to represent the effects of clouds very well. There is some evidence, 
however, that clouds play a very important role and that their net effect on a worldwide basis may be 
negative [46]. 
2.4. Hyposthesis 3a: Changes in Global Temperatures Are Primarily Influenced by Rising Levels of 
GHGs Other Than Water Vapor in the Atmosphere  
If CO2 has such a major role in determining global temperatures as the IPCC and CAGW supporters 
claim, it should be possible to discern its influence in the available related real world data. This line of 
inquiry is consistent with the theme of this article that reliance should be placed on real world data 
rather  than  computer  models  in  determining  the  validity  of  hypotheses  concerning  climate.  The 
comparisons made in this section do not prove the validity or invalidity of the various hypotheses 
offered by CAGW supporters. But they do serve as a credibility check on whether the above findings 
that the two key hypotheses 1 and 2 are invalid are likely to be correct. If there is clear evidence that 
hypothesis 3a is correct, one might reasonably suspect that the conclusions with regard to hypotheses 1 
or 2 might be incorrect despite the overwhelming real-world evidence that the invalidity conclusions 
are correct, and vice versa. 
Five lines of evidence will be presented in this section in the following subsections: 
2.4.1 Correlations of various physical attributes with global temperatures. 
2.4.2 Correlations of global temperatures with other explanations for variations. 
2.4.3 Decrease of temperatures during periods of rising CO2. 
2.4.4 Increases in satellite-measured temperatures show no indication of CO2 influence. 
2.4.5 Lack of influence of CO2 on temperatures over the last three million years. 
2.4.1. Correlations of Physical Attributes with Global Ground-Based Temperatures 
A  review  of  the  available  data  correlating  CO2  levels  with  global  temperatures  over  the  last  
110 years makes hypothesis 3 highly  suspect. Perhaps the  simplest way to  demonstrate this is to 
correlate various factors with global temperatures. One such study [47] found the following for three 
such factors (see Table 1):  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Table 1. Correlation of various physical attributes with global temperatures. Source: d‘Aleo [47]. 
Factor  Years 
Correlation  
(Pearson 
Coefficient)  
Correlation Strength  
(R-squared)  
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)  1895–2007   0.66   0.43  
Total Solar Irradiance (TSI)  1900–2004   0.76   0.57  
Ocean Warming Index (PDO and AMO)   1900–2007  0.92  0.85 
Carbon Dioxide Last Decade  1998–2007   –0.14   0.02  
 
It is very clear that the strongest correlation is between the ocean warming index consisting of the 
Pacific  Decadal  Oscillation  plus  the  Atlantic  Multidecadal  Oscillation  (PDO  +  AMO)  and 
temperatures; the next strongest is with total solar irradiance (TSI), and the weakest is with CO2. In 
fact, CO2 has no explanatory power over 1998–2007 decade according to this analysis.  
2.4.2. Correlations of Global Temperatures with Other Explanations for Variations 
Another  hypothesis  by  Orssengo  [48]  to  explain  temperature  variation  based  on  ground-based 
readings over the last 130 years assumes a gradually increasing trend presumably starting from the 
Dalton Minimum of the Little Ice Age with a 60-year cycle superimposed on it without reference to 
carbon dioxide or any of the other physical variables tried by d‘Aleo [47]. It is illustrated in Figure 5, 
which compares ground measurements of global temperatures with the hypothesis. This hypothesis 
may or may not prove to be accurate in forecasting future global temperatures, but Orssengo finds that 
it has an 88 percent correlation with past temperatures over the period studied. As shown in the figure, 
there are only a few years in the late 1890s and 1950s that do not appear to fit the hypothesis very well. 
So no strong support for the IPCC‘s CO2 hypothesis is evident here either. 
Figure 5. Graph depicting Orssengo‘s hypothesis concerning global temperatures. Source: 
Orssengo [48]. 
 Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
 
1005 
2.4.3. Decrease of Temperatures during Periods of Rising CO2 
A third problem with the CO2 hypothesis is that during the period from 1940 to 1970 and after 1998 
global ground-measured temperatures fell (see Figure 5) despite rising CO2 levels during both periods. 
There are either other important factors influencing global temperatures besides changes in CO2 or the 
CO2 hypothesis is incorrect. Neither explanation is very supportive of hypothesis 3a. 
2.4.4. Increases in Satellite-Measured Temperatures Show No Indication of CO2 Influence 
A fourth problem is that even during the periods of rising global temperatures as measured by 
ground instruments it is hard to see any real correspondence with the gradually rising CO2 levels in the 
satellite temperature data. In fact, there is increasing evidence that much of the increase in ground 
temperature measurments during the 1980s and early 1990s may be more the result of the urban heat 
island effect, the poor placement of measuring instruments, and even attempts by the compilers of 
temperature  data  to  manipulate  the  ground-based  station  data  than  it  is  of  actual  temperature  
increases [49]. The presumed effect of these various cycles is illustrated by a review of satellite data 
since it started in 1978 to date. Satellite data is not contaminated by the effects of urban heat islands 
(UHIs),  by  faulty  instrument  placement,  and  by  manipulations  of  the  surface  data  allegedly  to 
―improve‖ it. The satellite temperature data (which started in 1978) shows a significant increase only 
in 1998 leaving aside periodic oceanic oscillations (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6. Trend shift in monthly satellite global temperature data. Source: Arrak [50], as 
updated by him and communicated to the author in March, 2011. 
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Surface  measurements  have  so  many  problems  including  possible  efforts  to  manipulate  them, 
perhaps to achieve desired temperature trends, and the alleged loss of original data by the Climate 
Research  Unit  of  the  University  of  East  Anglia  [51]  that  it  is  probably  best  not  to  use  them  for 
analytical purposes. If CO2 increases have had such an important role in increasing global temperatures, 
it is strange that no such trends are evident in the satellite temperature data. As shown in Figures 6  
and 7, most of the evident changes in satellite-measured global temperatures appear to correspond to 
periodic oceanic oscillations (El Niñ o and La Niñ a) in the Pacific, known as ENSO variations, and one 
major volcanic eruption. The yellow dots in Figure 6 represent the mid-points between each El Nino 
peak and La Nina valley, and appear to form horizontal lines before and after 1998 in contrast to the 
continuing fairly steady rise exhibited by atmospheric CO2 levels. 
Figure 7. Climate events in relation to satellite global temperatures. Source: Arrak [50]. 
 
 
In the last 120 years or more there has been a clear variation in global temperatures with roughly 
alternating  warming  and  cooling  periods  each  lasting  about  30  years  for  a  cycle  length  of  about  
60 years total. In a 30-year time frame the trends, once started, appear to be form remarkably uniform 
trends.  The  reasons  for  this  cycle  are  not  widely  agreed  on,  but  any  attempt  to  explain  global 
temperatures needs to explain these observations if it is to be credible. The IPCC climate models do 
not. One strong possibility is oscillations in sea surface temperatures since changes in the direction of 
global temperatures seem to have a remarkable coincidence with at least some of these oscillations. 
Perhaps the most important of these cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), although others 
have been identified in other major oceanic areas (see [52], slides 20–25). The PDO is a long-lived El 
Niñ o/La Niñ a-like pattern that is observed in the sea-surface temperatures (SST) of the Northern and 
Central Pacific Ocean. Positive (/negative) phases of the PDO are typified by warmer (/cooler) than 
normal temperatures in the Northeastern and tropical Pacific Ocean and cooler (/warmer) than normal Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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temperatures in the region to the southwest of the Aleutian Islands. It is important to note that while 
the El Niñ o/La Niñ a oscillation varies on a time scale of 4–5 years, the PDO variations are governed 
by  a  time  scale  that  is  much  longer.  The  immediate  point  here  is  that  both  the  PDO  and  global 
temperatures have recently turned negative in recent years. Similarly, both turned positive in the 1970s. 
The reasons for this are speculative at best, but the correlation appears to be overwhelming for the 
limited period for which we have much data. One possibility is variations in solar output, but much 
more  complicated  hypotheses  have  been  proposed  [52].  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  human 
concerns  about  climate  change  appear  to  have  followed  these  PDO  variations  quite  closely  with 
concerns about global cooling and a possible new ice age near the end of the last PDO cooling period 
in the 1970s and concern about global warming in the 1990s and 2000s.  
So what would appear to be one of the best ―explanations‖ for the observed changes in global 
temperatures is provided by the PDO together with ENSO. In fact, major changes in the PDO from 
positive  to  negative  and  back  appear  to  coincide  almost  exactly  with  observed  changes  in  global 
temperature trends over 20–30 year timeframes, as hypothesized in Figure 5. 
These graphs are very interesting in another respect. This is that from the beginning of the satellite 
data in 1978 until 1997 there is no indication that the data varies as a result of changes in CO2. 
Ambient CO2 levels were increasing throughout this period yet global satellite-measured temperatures 
remained in a narrow band with little apparent increase. Further, the spike in temperatures in 1998 
appears highly unlikely to have been caused by changes in CO2 levels since they vary only very slowly 
rather than exhibiting the sharp spike seen here. Similarly, the period 1999 to 2006 shows another 
narrow  but  higher  band  of  temperatures  with  no  increase  during  the  period.  Finally,  the  period  
2007–2009 shows a strong downward trend in temperatures, which is surely not related to steadily 
increasing CO2 levels in the atmosphere. Thus it is very hard to see any effect during the period 1978 
to 2009 that can reasonably ascribed to changing CO2 or GHG levels. This is in marked contrast with 
ground  level  measurements  such  as  the  HadCRUT  series,  which  show  a  marked  increase  in 
temperatures through 1998 (see Figure 5) but not thereafter. One possible explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency  between  the  ground  level  measurements  and  satellite  data  is  that  ground  level 
measurements may inevitably be compromised by the urban heat island effects, which presumably 
increased rapidly during the period due to rapid urbanization in many parts of the world. 
Given all this, it is hardly surprising that several physical attributes and one model have much 
higher correlations than does carbon dioxide, which the UN IPCC thinks is the best explanation for 
increasing global temperatures.  
2.4.5. Lack of Influence of CO2 on Temperatures over the Last Three Million Years  
From a  much longer term perspective over the last 3 million years of Earth history, CO2 also 
appears to have played a very limited role in setting interglacial temperatures according to Marsh [53]. 
Temperatures during past interglacial periods were higher than today most likely as a consequence of 
lower  global  cloud  albedo  due  to  periodic  decreases  in  cosmic  ray  flux  reaching  the  Earth‘s 
atmosphere, he believes. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Although the research summarized in this subsection does not disprove hypothesis 3a, it certainly 
casts  considerable  doubt  on  it.  The  apparent  invalidity  of  hypotheses  1  and  2  suggests  why  
hypothesis 3a may not be more successful. 
2.5. Implications of Shorter Residence Time and Lower CSF for CAGW 
The much shorter residence time for CO2 in the atmosphere and the lower CSF determined above 
have important implications for the IPCC postulated adverse effects of CAGW. The shorter residence 
time suggests that the fossil fuel contribution to increasing the level of Earth‘s atmospheric CO2 is 
actually quite small and thus unlikely to produce CAGW effects other than those experienced over the 
last three million years. The effects on the atmosphere of such contributions appear to be relatively 
short-lived, very small compared with the vast CO2 absorption capacity of the oceans, and unlikely to 
result in runaway catastrophic global temperature effects.  
The much lower CSF suggests that even the highly doubtful doubling of atmospheric CO2 levels 
would produce only about a 0.6 to 0.7 
oC increase in global temperatures. This is less than the increase 
in global temperatures since the Dalton minimum of the Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Earth has 
seen increases of this magnitude during the current interglacial period before and there is no evidence 
of major CAGW effects as described by CAGW believers.  
On the contrary, the evidence is that during interglacial periods over the last 3 million years the 
risks are on the temperature downside, not the upside. As we approach the point where the Holocene 
has  reached  the  historical  age  when  a  new  ice  age  has  repeatedly  started  in  past  glacial  cycles,  
this  appears  likely  to  be  the  only  CAGW  effect  that  mankind  should  currently  reasonably  be  
concerned about. 
Earth is currently in an interglacial period quite similar to others before and after each of the glacial 
periods that Earth has experienced over the last 3 million years. During these interglacial periods there 
is  currently  no  known  case  where  global  temperatures  suddenly  and  dramatically  warmed  above 
interglacial temperatures, such as we are now experiencing, to very much warmer temperatures. There 
have, of course, been interglacial periods that have experienced slightly higher temperatures, but none 
that we know of that after 10,000 years experienced a sudden catastrophic further increase in global 
temperatures. The point here is that there does not appear to be instability towards much warmer 
temperatures during interglacial periods. There is rather instability towards much colder temperatures, 
particularly during the later stages of interglacial periods. In fact, Earth has repeatedly entered new ice 
ages  about  every  100,000  years  during  recent  cycles,  and  interglacial  periods  have  lasted  about  
10,000 years. We are currently very close to the 10,000 year mark for the current interglacial period. 
So if history is any guide, the main worry should be that of entering a new ice age, with its growing ice 
sheets,  that  would  probably  wipe  out  civilization  in  the  temperate  regions  of  the  Northern 
Hemisphere—not global warming. The economic damages from a new ice age would indeed be large, 
and almost certainly catastrophic. Unfortunately, it is very likely to occur sooner or later. 
There is no real evidence that this three million year old periodicity in global temperatures has or 
will change any time soon. And if it did, it would be good rather than bad for humans in that it would 
mean that there would be less of a threat of a new ice age, which would surely be worse for human 
economic activity than further minor warming. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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2.6. General Conclusions Concerning the Economic Benefits of GHG Mitigation 
The conclusion from this analysis is that hypotheses 1 and 2 are invalid based on the best current 
data, and that hypothesis 3a is of doubtful scientific validity and casts still further doubt on the validity 
of 1 and 2. As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, however, these conclusions are all subject to case-by-case 
analysis to determine the validity and relevance of the data used. But as a result, the benefit estimates 
made by many economists for reducing CO2 emissions appear to need to be greatly reduced to account 
for the effects of the reduced CSF and the much shorter residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere.  
None of the economists and other policy analysts who have attempted to determine the economic 
benefits of climate change control reviewed here has given any indication that I have been able to find 
that  they  checked  whether  the  physical  science  inputs  they  directly  or  indirectly  used  were  valid 
science based on their correspondence to real world data using the scientific method.  
Benefit  estimates  are  based  on  the  economic  effects  of  the  temperature  increase  avoided  by 
decreasing emissions due to mitigation. The emissions decrease from mitigation is assumed to reduce 
the ambient or atmospheric levels of CO2 that would otherwise exist. This ambient CO2 reduction is 
then  assumed  to  result  in  a  temperature  decrease  using  the  assumed  CSF.  But  if  the  emissions 
reductions  from  mitigation  have  little  effect  on  ambient  CO2  levels  (as  would  be  the  case  since 
hypothesis 1 appears to be invalid), then there would be little or no change in ambient CO2 levels and 
hence little change in temperatures, especially at the reduced CSF level.  
2.6.1. Effect of Reduced CO2 Residence Time on the Economic Benefits of Emissions Control 
It  appears  that  the  effect  of  the  economic  correction  resulting  from  the  apparent  invalidity  of 
hypothesis  1  is  very  large,  as  discussed  in  Section  2.2  above.  According  to  Segalstad‘s  analysis 
[8,10,12] summarized there, CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere for a little more than 5 years, on 
average, after which they are absorbed by the oceans, plants, or ocean sediments, where they would 
have no effect on global temperatures through greenhouse gas effects. The economic benefits from 
mitigation efforts carried out in any one year would accordingly only be during the following five 
years on average.  
Lacking clear information on what assumptions were actually used concerning residence time by 
the IPCC and the models they used, or those used directly or indirectly by previous economic analyses, 
I  propose  to  use  a  correction  factor  equal  to  Segalstad‘s  5  year  residence  time,  as  developed  in  
Section 2.2, divided by 125 years (taking the 1990 IPCC report‘s midpoint between 50 and 2000 years), 
or  0.04.  If  what  appears  to  be  Solomon  et  al.‘s  more  than  1000  year  estimate  (see  [9]  and  the 
discussion of it in Section 2.2) was used in the AR4 models, the correction factor would be less than 
0.005, so the correction factor used may need to be almost a further order of magnitude less. 
The argument is that an added ton of CO2 prevented from entering the atmosphere will mean that 
atmospheric CO2 will be decreased for about five years relative to what it would otherwise have been 
during that period. This decrease will decrease global temperatures very slightly compared to what 
they would otherwise have been based on the CSF during that period, but on average not thereafter. 
But at the end of the period, the decreased atmospheric CO2 levels will have reverted on average to 
what they would have been without the emission reduction.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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A good argument can be made that because the economic benefits of control should be discounted 
that the above fraction overstates the correction that needs to be made. Obviously a more refined 
estimate  could  be  made  taking  into  account  the  appropriate  discounting  of  future  reductions  of 
economic benefits that would no longer occur, but it would be messy given the different discount rates 
that previous economic analysts have used, the sketchy basis for what the IPCC models and each 
previous economic analysis assumed in the regard, and the necessity to compute individual corrections 
for individual analyses. In the case of those economic analyses that have used near-zero discount rates, 
however,  the  discount  rate  adjustment  would  also  be  near  zero.  And  these  are  probably  the  only 
analyses for which there is likely to be much question as to whether the remaining economic benefits 
after hypotheses 1 and 2 corrections have been made might still be significant. Also the overstatement 
of the residence time correction due to ignoring the discount rate correction may be counterbalanced 
by the assumption that the IPCC computer models used in earlier economic analyses effectively only 
assumed a 125 year residence time when in reality they may have assumed that it was over 1000 years.  
2.6.2. Effect of Reduced CSF on the Economic Benefits of Emissions Control 
A lower CSF means a lower temperature increase, which also means lower economic benefits of 
control. Further research may show that the CSF is a little higher or a little lower, but it is clear that the 
UN  IPCC  CSF  estimates  are  much  too  high  based  on  the  four  real  world  tests  summarized  in  
Section 2.3.  
If valid physical science relationships were used in the case of hypothesis 2, the economic benefits 
would have been much less, probably less than one-fourth those used on the basis of the CSFs based 
on the 2007 IPCC best estimate. If the Lindzen/Choi [21,39] and Spencer/Braswell [41] CSF findings 
are correct, this means that benefit estimates that were based on the IPCC AR4 [5] best estimate of  
3.0  ° C  need  to  be  multiplied  by  a  fraction  no  more  than  that  determined  by  either  the  latest  
Lindzen [21,39] CSF estimate of 0.7 or the Spencer/Braswell [41] estimate of 0.6, each divided by 3. 
This yields a correction factor of between 0.20 and 0.23. For simplicity this article will assume this 
fraction to be less than one-quarter or 0.25. This assumes that the economic benefits can be scaled 
linearly  with  temperature.  In  reality,  it  appears  likely  that  the  benefits  rise  more  rapidly  with 
temperature, particularly at extremely high temperature changes, so one-quarter is an underestimation 
of the change in the actual revised benefits. One footnote is that a number of the economic benefit 
studies were done prior to the IPCC AR4, and the earlier IPCC reports used slightly different values 
for the best estimate for CSF, although the changes were small. 
Such reduced increases in global average temperatures do not appear to be large enough for there to 
be any significant risk of CAGW since even a doubling of CO2 levels would result in less than a  
0.7  ° C  increase  in  global  temperatures,  which  is  well  within  temperature  variations  during  the 
Holocene  and  during  which  no  CAGW  effects  are  known  to  have  occurred.  Hence  by  carefully 
examining  the  science,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  CAGW  effects  are  highly  unlikely  and 
probably  impossible.  That  leaves  the  non-catastrophic  economic  benefits  from  avoiding  relatively 
minor increases in global temperatures. Although extreme increases in global temperatures might have 
substantial adverse effects, it is not clear in the case of small increases suggested by CSFs of 0.6 to  
0.7 ° C whether increases of that magnitude would be beneficial rather than harmful. Tol [54] believes Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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they would be beneficial. If significant warming occurred, Northern areas of the Northern Hemisphere 
would presumably be opened to cultivation and use, as Southern Greenland was in the Medieval Warm 
Period. The scientific validity of physical science hypotheses such as the value of the CSF can only be 
determined by comparisons with real world data using the scientific method and not by the use of peer 
review  or  atmospheric  models  or  statements  by  experts.  Although  Lindzen/Choi  [21,39]  and 
Spencer/Braswell [41] have derived their estimates of the CSF by using real world data, that does not 
prove that their estimates will ultimately prove accurate. They do, however, appear to be much more 
solidly grounded in real world observations than the IPCC AR4 primarily model-based estimates. And 
they are consistent with the four negative tests of the high CSFs used by the IPCC AR4 discussed in 
Section 2.3.  
2.6.3. Combined Effect of the CSF and Residence Time Corrections 
The net result of combining both the hypotheses 1 and 2 correction adjustments suggest above 
would be a combined factor of roughly 0.04 times 0.25, or 0.01. This would mean that all benefit 
estimates that have not adjusted for the postulated invalidities of hypotheses 1 and 2 would need to be 
divided by about 100. The result would be that most benefit estimates would be so small as not to be 
worth further discussion. 
3. The Economic Costs of Climate Change Mitigation 
I believe that there are also significant differences in the costs of reducing CAGW than usually 
assumed by many economists who have examined this question. First, the much smaller CSF and 
shorter residence times for CO2 in the atmosphere explained in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.6 above greatly 
increase the cost of reducing CO2 emissions per degree of assumed global cooling achieved since it 
takes much more of a change in CO2 emissions to reduce temperatures by a given quantity. In other 
words, just as an increase in atmospheric GHG levels increases temperatures much less than assumed 
by the IPCC, reductions in CO2 emissions would be much less effective in decreasing temperatures. 
Note  that  this  does  not  change  the  total  cost  of  mitigation  because  there  will  presumably  be 
proportionately less of a temperature increase to mitigate. The second difference is that most efforts to 
estimate costs of CO2 emissions reductions appear to have greatly underestimated the actual costs. The 
third difference is that with one exception only one of the analysts discussed in this paper looked at 
alternative less expensive methods for achieving such mitigation should it ever be needed and desired. 
These three differences will be discussed in the next three subsections. 
3.1. Why the Effectiveness of Proposed Reductions in CO2 Emissions in Reducing Temperature 
Increases Will Be Much Lower than Assumed by Many Economists 
The much lower CSF found by Lindzen/Choi [21,39] and Spencer/Braswell [41] affects the costs as 
well  as  the  benefits  of  global  warming  mitigation.  As  outlined  in  Section  2.6,  the  hypothesized 
increase in global temperatures would be more than four times less than shown by the IPCC AR4 
models  because  the  CSF  appears  to  be  at  least  four  times  less.  If  the  economic  damages  are 
proportional to the temperature increase, then damages (benefits of mitigation) would be more than Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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four times lower. Similarly, the cost of each degree of mitigation would be at least four times higher 
since the effect of lowering CO2 levels would be less than one-fourth as much. So the economic 
benefits of mitigation would be only one-fourth as much while the overall cost of mitigation would 
remain the same but achieve less than one-fourth the global temperature reduction previously assumed. 
As a result the benefit-cost ratio of ―conventional‖ reductions in CO2 emissions would be less than 
one-fourth the levels previously calculated, all other things being equal. Thus the temperature increases 
to be mitigated would be less than one-quarter those assumed in the benefit studies, so the benefits of 
most  proposed  mitigation  efforts  would  be  less  than  one-quarter,  but  the  cost  of  mitigating  these 
damages would remain the same.  
Similarly,  the  much  lower  and  empirically  derived  residence  times  for  CO2  in  the  atmosphere 
greatly reduce the effectiveness of CO2 emissions reductions in decreasing atmospheric CO2 levels and 
therefore temperatures. There is much less of an increase in temperatures to offset, but the cost of 
offsetting them would be much the same as has previously been estimated by other analysts.  
3.2. The Cost of Reducing Carbon Emissions Are Much Higher than Usually Assumed 
I have shown elsewhere that using the UN IPCC assumptions the 2 
oC EU target is not likely to be 
achievable even at very high cost [55] (particularly pp. 712–716 and Appendix 1). The acronym ERD 
means  exclusive  regulatory  decarbonization  and  is  discussed  further  in  Section  3.3  below.  The 
following excerpt summarizes this finding [55] with a reference added: 
―Even if climate sensitivity to increased CO2 is what the IPCC says it is, the modeling 
work by Rive et al. suggests that it would not only be risky but also very expensive to 
actually achieve the two degrees Celsius limit using ERD [56]. They find that to obtain a 
mere fifty percent chance of preventing more than a two degrees Celsius increase would 
require a global cut of eighty percent from current industrial emission levels by 2050 at a 
marginal cost of $3,500 per ton of carbon equivalent assuming average projections and 
―early action‖ to reduce GHGs. $3,500 is roughly an order of magnitude higher than most 
previous estimates  of marginal costs,  presumably reflecting the extremely  high cost  of 
rapidly replacing most of the energy producing and using capital stock. An eighty percent 
cut would imply a reduction per person of about eighty-seven percent below current levels 
because  of  predicted  world  population  growth.  This  appears  to  be  of  very  doubtful 
practicality, particularly at the extremely high marginal costs estimated by Rive et al., and 
has a mere fifty percent chance of ―success‖ even in the ―ideal‖ world of modeling. This 
suggests that in the real world a serious effort to achieve such cuts would be extremely 
expensive, require worldwide cooperation and an early start, and be much more likely to 
lead to catastrophe than success….Rive et al. furthermore find that if we wait an additional 
ten years to implement serious emissions reductions, a fifty percent change would not be 
achievable at all, again assuming ―average‖ projections….The apparent implication is that 
even under a two degrees Celsius limit and three degrees Celsius sensitivity ERD is a very 
long shot with little real hope of meeting the two degrees Celsius limit even before taking 
into account the wide gap that is almost certain to exist between what is actually achieved 
and what countries and their citizens may agree to do.‖ Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Galiana and Green [57] also argue that most prior cost of mitigation analyses are grossly optimistic. 
Their arguments are summarized in the following excerpt: 
―A ‗thought experiment‘ helps to illustrate. Suppose the emission reduction target is an 
80% reduction in global emission from current levels by 2100. To reach the 2100 target 
requires  a 1.8%  average  annual rate of decline in  carbon emissions.  Now suppose  the 
expected ‗trend‘ rate of growth in global world output (GWP) from 2010–2050 is 2.2%. To 
avoid a reduction in the growth rate of GWP would require a 4.0% average annual rate of 
decline in the carbon intensity of output (RCIO)….  
―If a policy of reducing emissions by ―brute force‖ is adopted, irrespective of technical 
feasibility, even an increase in the average annual RCIO to 3.6% from its ‗historic‘ rate of 
1.3% (a very unlikely event in the absence of a technology-led policy) implies a reduction 
in the growth rate of GWP from the 2.2% ‗trend‘ rate to 1.8% for the period 2010–2100. 
Such  a  reduction  would  cost  (an  undiscounted)  $86  trillion  in  2100  alone  and  an 
undiscounted $2280 trillion cumulative over the 90 year interval. (It is assumed GWP in 
2010 is $41 trillion, measured in MER terms.) And even these huge reductions in GWP 
would not do the trick (meet the emission target) if we cannot push the rate of decline in 
C/GWP up to 3.6% (which is almost triple the ―historic‖ rate). 
―The ‗thought experiment‘ casts serious doubt on the credibility of estimates of the cost of 
stabilizing climate. Estimates in the 1 to 3% of global GDP range—or lower (Stern, 2007; 
IPCC, 2007) are not credible unless there is a prior focus on reducing the technology gap. 
The low-cost estimates reflect a variety of self-serving assumptions. Some models employ 
an  emission  scenario  baseline  that  builds  in  large,  automatic  improvements  in  energy 
technology. Other models include a carbon-free backstop technology (often generic) that 
assures that once the carbon price reaches a specified level there is an unlimited supply of 
carbon  emission-free  energy  forthcoming.  Still  others  have  very  high  implicit  rates  of 
energy intensity decline, ones that would almost surely be physically impossible to achieve. 
Finally, some models make very optimistic assumptions (ones generally inconsistent with 
the evidence) about the availability and readiness of carbon-neutral technologies and/or the 
responsiveness of successful innovation of new energy technologies to carbon prices.  
―None of these modeling conveniences or assumptions contribute to a reliable approach to 
estimating the cost of mitigation. Perhaps the most deceptive are models that build-in a 
backstop carbon-free energy technology, because this effectively assumes away what is the 
problem. Unless a specific effort is made to research and develop, test, and make ready-for 
deployment scalable carbon emission-free technologies, the cost of mitigation is likely to 
be as much as an order of magnitude, or more, higher than has been reported.‖  
Galiana  and  Green‘s  order  of  magnitude  cost  increase  appears  reasonable;  I  am  much  less 
optimistic, however, that a research and development effort such as they propose is likely to solve the 
problem  of  astronomical  costs.  The  costs  of  CO2  emissions  reductions  on  the  scale  proposed  by 
CAGW supporters are very large and much higher than usually quoted. If ―conventional‖ mitigation is 
to be attempted (and I do not believe that it is economically justified or currently needed), some way Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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would  need  to  be  found  to  reduce  the  costs  substantially.  Galiana  and  Green  [57]  as  well  as  
Lomborg [58], based on their work, suggest that the way to do this is to impose a low level carbon tax 
to generate revenue for technological research to bring down the costs of reducing CO2 emissions. 
Their  arguments  have  some  merit,  but  there  is  considerable  doubt  whether  throwing  even  more 
research money at the climate change problem (even before Obama, the US Government was spending 
about $5 billion per year on climate-related research [59] will produce the technological progress 
needed to substantially reduce the costs? Or would more money simply build an even larger and better 
funded research community to lobby for even more funds? The answer is that research is inherently 
unpredictable  and  there  is  no  assurance  that  even  greater  amounts  will  ―solve‖  broadly  focused 
problems such as cancer, or in this case, energy efficiency. 
Research and development designed to exploit a promising new technological opportunity is a very 
different thing than attempting technological improvements over a broad but well researched set of 
possibilities, none of which offer immediate reason to believe a breakthrough is imminent. The US 
Government had great success with a narrowly focused Manhattan Project during World War II but in 
that case there was a narrowly focused goal which attempted to exploit a new technological approach, 
Such is not the case here, where any number of technologies would need to be explored with none 
holding out great current promise of major cost reductions. 
As an example, it now appears that an important advance has been made by combining horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology to obtain both oil and natural gas from shale formations. 
This may promise the US and a number of other countries with suitable such formations the possibility 
of energy independence from the Middle East, but this breakthrough was not achieved by a large 
government-run  research  effort  but  rather  by  private  initiative  over  many  years.  Technological 
progress requires not just more government research expenditures, but also luck and a willingness to 
follow valid scientific principles that are needed to carry out good science. The much lower energy 
costs promised by this particular technological breakthrough also raises the bar for developing new 
reduced CO2 emitting technologies that much higher since the increased production of natural gas and 
oil using these technologies promise lower fuel costs which any lower carbon emitting alternative 
would have to meet to be competitive and therefore viable without government subsidies—presumably 
the goal of Lomborg [58] and Galiana and Green‘s [57] proposed research. 
3.3. Geoengineering as an Alternative to Reducing GHG Emissions Needs to Be Considered 
Fortunately, as Lomborg [58] has recognized, there is an alternative to what appears to be a rather 
futile effort to reduce carbon emissions [55]. This alternative is geoengineering. This promises global 
temperature  decreases  (or  increases  if  needed)  at  a  tiny  fraction  of  the  cost  of  carbon  emissions 
reductions  with  much  greater  certainty  [55,60].  One  of  the  major  assumptions  made  by  those 
advocating climate change mitigation has been that the way to do it is by reducing human-caused 
emissions  of  GHGs.  Perhaps  because  CAGW  supporters  allege  that  it  is  increasing  GHG  levels, 
particularly CO2, that  is causing  and will cause the increase  in  temperatures, this assumption has 
apparently  been  plausible  enough  to  many  people  that  little  effort  has  been  made  by  most 
environmental economists (or physical scientists, for that matter) to determine whether such reductions Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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actually  would  reduce  global  warming  or  whether  there  might  be  other  less  expensive  or  more 
effective alternatives that would accomplish such a reduction in global warming.  
Speaking broadly, most environmental economists who have examined the costs of GHG mitigation 
have directly or indirectly assumed that (1) reducing GHG emissions will significantly reduce global 
warming, (2) such reductions are either the best alternative available for this purpose or at least the 
only one worth examining, and (3) geo-engineering approaches either are not worth examining or can 
be ruled out for various reasons, particularly ―tampering with nature‖ and the possibility of unintended 
consequences [55,60]. The major exception is Lomborg [58] and associates [61], who have examined 
some  geoengineering  approaches  in  great  detail,  and  whose  views  will  be  discussed  further  in  
Section 5.2 below.  
The  most  prominent  lower  cost  alternatives  involve  geoengineering,  which  in  this  case  means 
deliberate  modification  of  the  atmosphere  by  humans.  There  are  a  number  of  varieties  involving 
different approaches towards reducing global temperatures. One of these approaches, involving placing 
various types of particles into the stratosphere to increase or decrease the reflection of incoming solar 
radiation  [60]  so  that  they  will  not  be  washed  out  by  rain,  is  sometimes  called  solar  radiation 
management or SRM. Another involves placing salt molecules into air above oceans using ships [61].  
Previous research [55,60] resulted in comparisons between SRM and reductions in GHG emissions 
(see Table 2), referred to as exclusive regulatory decarbonization (ERD). ERD is defined as a strategy 
for  decreasing  emissions  of  greenhouse  gases  as  the  exclusive  approach  used  to  control  global 
warming. Most current climate change control proposals involve some form of ERD such as emission 
regulations, emission taxes, fuel economy, bio-fuel standards, and ―cap and trade‖ proposals. ERD 
assumes that if we could just reduce carbon emissions that humans are putting into the environment, 
the global warming problem would be solved. I have termed such attempts ERD because most, but not 
all, involve decreasing various forms of carbon emissions.  
As can be seen in the table under marginal costs, rough estimates place the equivalent cost of 
reducing carbon emissions as 4 to 5 orders of magnitude (that is, 10,000 to 100,000 times) less than the 
cost by reducing carbon emissions. As discussed in Section 3.2 the actual costs of ERD are probably 
another order of magnitude higher than shown. These estimates are necessarily rough given that no 
actual  geoengineering  experimentation  has  been  done  by  humans.  And  various  other  forms  of 
geoengineering probably have somewhat higher or lower costs. The differences, however, are so large 
that it is reasonable to assume that at least SRM and possibly some other geoengineering approaches 
are  much  less  expensive.  And  most  important,  the  global  temperature  effects  of  SRM  have  been 
repeatedly demonstrated by nature as a result of major volcanic eruptions in the tropics. Such is not the 
case for emissions reductions, which have not been demonstrated to actually achieve any temperature 
reductions. A very important consideration is that with adequate preparation, no actual use of SRM 
would be needed until there were clear and immediate risks of either decreases or increases in global 
temperatures that posed a serious risk to humans or the environment. Errors could be quickly corrected 
by altering the type, quantity, or placement of particles in the stratosphere. Emissions reductions, on 
the other hand, require a guess decades in advance as to when and how adverse an effect may occur 
and how much of a decrease/increase in GHGs might be required to mitigate these effects. If the 
assumed CSF or CO2 residence time in the atmosphere prove to be incorrect or people or governments 
do not fulfill their obligations, it would take several additional decades to correct any errors made Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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because  of  the  long  time  lag  required  to  alter  behavior  and  significantly  change  atmospheric  
GHG levels.  
Table 2. Comparison of SRM and ERD approaches to climate mitigation
a. 
Control Approach  Solar Radiation Management 
(SRM) 
Exclusive Regulatory Decarbonization (ERD) 
Time to modify  Months  Decades at best 
Ability to handle 
uncertainties 
Very great  Very limited by need for new international 
negotiations 
Catastrophic changes   Capable of fully avoiding if  
rapid action taken 
50% probability at best of achieving less than 2 °C  
increase using IPCC assumptions
b 
Ocean acidification  No effect  Reduce w/difficulty, not solve
c 
Marginal cost/ton  
carbon equivalent 
$0.02 to 0.10  $3,500 to achieve 2 °C  w/50% probability
d  
assuming high IPCC CSF and long CO2 residence 
times in atmosphere 
Cumulative overall costs 
Development 
Control  
(undiscounted to 2100) 
~$0.001 ×  10
12  
~$0.090 ×  10
12  
(undiscounted to 2100) 
>>$0.45 ×  $10
12e 
~$2300 ×  10
12f  
Effectiveness   Demonstrated by major volcanic 
eruptions to be very high 
Probably fairly low given low CSF and unwillingness 
of humans to reduce GHGs 
Other environmental 
effects 
Unknown and untested  
but likely 
Some already evident like rainforest destruction from 
oil palm expansion 
Participation needed  
 
Government involvement 
desirable initially; not required 
Mandatory actions by most governments, companies, 
and people 
Sources: a. Based on Carlin [55], Table 1, which is based on Carlin [60], unless otherwise stated. IPCC 
assumptions used for ERD. b. Rive, et al. [56], Table 1. This assumes a goal of staying below a 2 °C  
temperature  increase  from  pre-industrial  levels  in  order  to  avoid  dangerous  climate  changes  as  per 
European Union policy. c. See discussion in [55], Section II.B.3, pp. 734–735. d. Rive et al. [56], p. 385. 
e.  Nova  [59],  p.  17  shows  about  $5  billion  per  year  in  the  last  few  years  for  climate  science  and 
technology expenditures for the US alone. Other nations, particularly in Western Europe, have also had 
substantial  expenditures.  These  expenditures  have  substantially  increased  under  the  Obama 
Administration, as shown in the Nova 2009 total, and would be very likely to be much higher if serious 
CO2 emission reductions should be undertaken. f. Galiana and Green [57], p. 20. 
 
If 80% emissions reductions are to be achieved by 2050, as the Waxman-Markey bill in the US 
House of Representatives [7] proposed, taking account of population growth and increases in energy 
use since 1990, the reductions ―needed‖ per person would be almost 90% (see [55], p. 721). Given the 
rapid spread of new energy using technology such as computers, server farms, cell phones, and other 
electronic gadgets, this appears more than unlikely.  
In reality, most experience to date has been that in political jurisdictions where the most serious 
energy efficiency efforts have been made, the ―best‖ that has been achieved is that GHG emissions 
have been held steady because the emissions reductions have been balanced out by increases brought 
about by demand for increased use by increasing urban populations (see [55], pp. 721–725). Finally, as 
summarized in Table 2, stratospheric SRM would much  more reliably achieve cooling at a small 
fraction of the huge costs of reducing GHG emissions. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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So although SRM and other geoengineering approaches to controlling global warming have obvious 
problems such as who is to make the decisions and on what basis [62], it appears that they would 
accomplish the goal of reducing (or increasing for that matter) global temperatures at a far more 
reasonable cost and to do so fairly promptly and reliably. It would appear desirable for economists to 
at least analyze this possibility in discussions of the costs of CAGW control.  
One benefit of SRM is that it can be used entirely as a very low cost insurance policy until and 
unless there is strong evidence that global temperatures are increasing (or decreasing) rapidly. This 
insurance  policy  should  entirely  eliminate  the  need  to  be  concerned  about  low  probability,  high 
consequence CAGW effects since action could be taken if and when needed rather than decades in 
advance as in the case of ERD.  
3.4. Implications for the Costs of Climate Change 
If  economists  had  carefully  considered  the  scientific  validity  of  the  physical  aspects  of  the 
environmental benefits and the costs of alternatives to emissions reductions they would have probably 
been less likely to recommend reducing global GHG emissions and more likely to have recommended 
geoengineering that although controversial has a high likelihood and low cost of controlling global 
temperatures should that be needed and desired. The possibility of using geoengineering eliminates the 
argument for pursuing very high cost GHG-mitigation alternatives as a safety hedge against small risks 
of CAGW outcomes since these low-cost approaches can be implemented very rapidly if they should 
actually  ever  be  needed  and  if  minimal  research  has  been  carried  out  in  advance  and  a  
decision-making  process  has  been  put  in  place.  Because  mitigation  measures  do  not  have  to  be 
undertaken decades in advance, even these much lower operating costs can be postponed until there 
should be an evident need. 
4. Implications for the Benefit-Cost Analysis of Climate Change Mitigation 
The broad results of this analysis to this point are that the economic benefits of climate change 
mitigation appear to be perhaps 1/100th of those assumed by most economic analyses because of real 
world  data  showing  a  much  lower  CSF  and  shorter  CO2  residence  times  in  the  atmosphere  than 
assumed by the IPCC. The costs, on the other hand, would appear to be about an order of magnitude 
higher because of technological and implementation problems recently identified. This means that 
―conventional‖  benefit-cost  analysis  would  conclude  that  the  proposed  climate  change  mitigation 
would be much more likely to fail an economic efficiency test than previously estimated. But the costs 
of  control  can  be  greatly  reduced  by  adopting  an  entirely  different  approach  to  mitigation 
(geoengineering such as SRM) based on very promising but largely ignored technology. The costs of 
this promising but so far not carefully validated approach appear to be many orders of magnitude less 
expensive, albeit with possible new and also little researched risks. These costs are so low that climate 
change  mitigation  might  actually  be  economically  efficient  if  global  temperatures  should  start 
decreasing rapidly (since SRM can be used on the temperature downside as well as the upside). This 
approach  also  removes  concern  about  low  probability,  high  consequence  events  arising  from 
increasing  global  temperatures  since  geoengineering  options  such  as  SRM  can  be  implemented Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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extremely rapidly with adequate preparations, unlike (probably futile) attempts to reduce atmospheric 
CO2 levels decades in advance, as currently proposed by the UN and some Western governments.  
On the other hand, the risk of CAGW appears to be so low (given the low CSF and the short 
residence time of the fossil fuel contribution to increasing the level of Earth‘s atmospheric CO2) that it 
does not appear to be worth even trying to do anything to mitigate it currently, particularly since the 
world  has  any  number  of  other  problems  that  appear  to  be  more  urgent.  But  if  an  economically 
efficient control effort should ever be needed, which eventually it probably will as we approach the 
end of the Holocene with a high likelihood of a new ice age, the most economically efficient approach 
appears to be by using geoengineering such as SRM assuming adequate research and validation has 
been  undertaken  beforehand  and  reasonable  implementation  approaches  are  devised.  So  it  would 
appear worthwhile to undertake these comparatively inexpensive preparatory efforts anyway. 
5. Some Comparisons with Other Economic Analyses of Climate Change Control 
There have been at least 16 economic analyses of climate change control in the literature broadly 
construed. Table 3 summarizes the economic effects of the increases in global temperatures shown in 
most  of  these  analyses,  based  primarily  on  Tol  [54].  In  addition,  there  have  been  two  major 
government reports: one in Great Britain, Stern [63], and one in Australia, Garnaut [64]. Finally there 
is a more popular article by Krugman (2010) [65]. Tol [54] summarizes the findings of most of the 
academic  articles/books  with  estimates  of  the  uncertainty  given  in  brackets,  either  as  standard 
deviations or as 95% confidence intervals where available. Fragmentary data from the other three 
studies above are listed at the bottom of Table 3. 
Most of the first 13 studies listed in the table find that temperature increases of 1 to 3 °C  will result 
in decreases in GDP (or more accurately GWP) of a few percent. The principal outliers would appear 
to be those by Tol [54,74], Stern [63], Garnaut [64], and Krugman [65]. Tol [54] believes that minor 
warming would result in higher growth and is thus one of the principal outliers on the optimistic side. 
The last three, on the other hand, appear to be outliers on the pessimistic side. Stern has been criticized 
by Nordhaus [79] for using unreasonably low interest rates to justify what Krugman [65] calls the ―big 
bang‖ approach, which also applies to the other major government report by Garnaut [64], which uses 
an even lower rate. I can only agree. The exact effect of the reduction in the value of the CSF on the 
outcome of each analysis would require detailed reanalysis in each case, but except for Krugman and 
the two government reports it seems likely that it would make the difference between positive and 
negative net benefits in most cases. This is the case for the one positive scenario reported by Tol [54]. 
The next two subsections will summarize two of the most recent analyses by Krugman [65] and 
Lomborg [58], both of which have unusual and significant features with regard to this analysis and 
illustrate the profound effect of the basic assumptions by each analyst on their recommendations. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Table 3. Some previous estimates of the economic benefits of climate change control. 
Study  Warming (
oC)  Impact (%GDP) 
Nordhaus (1994) [66]  3.0  –1.3 
Nordhaus (1994) [67]  3.0  –4.8 (–30 to 0) 
Fankhauser (1995) [68]  2.5  –1.4 
Tol (1995) [69]  2.5  –1.9 
Nordhaus and Yang
a (1996) [70]  2.5  –1.7 
Plamberk and Hope
a (1996) [71]  2.5  –2.5 (–0.5 to –11.4) 
Mendelsohn et al.
a,b,c (2000) [72] 
 
2.5  0.0
b 
0.1
b 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) [73]  2.5  –1.5 
Tol (2002a) [74]  1.0  2.3 
Maddison (2003)
 a,d,e [75]  2.5  –0.1 
Rehdanz and Maddison
a,c (2005) [76]  1.0  –0.4 
Hope (2006)
 a,f [77]  2.5  0.9 (–0.2 to 2.7) 
Nordhaus (2006) [78]  2.5  –0.9 (0.1) 
Stern (2006) [63]    –5 to as much as –20% 
Garnaut (2008) [64]  5.1   
Krugman (2010) [65]  (5.0)
 g  (–5)
 g  
Sources: Tol [54] summary for first 13 studies. Fragmentary data for last three based on this author‘s 
reading  of  these  studies.  Notes  on  Table:  a.  The  global  results  were  aggregated  by  Tol  [54].  
b. The top estimate is for the ―experimental‖ model, the bottom estimate for the ―cross-sectional‖ 
model. c. Mendelsohn et al. only include market impacts. d. The national results were aggregated to 
regions  by  the  current  author  for  reasons  of  comparability.  e.  Maddison  only  considers  market 
impacts  on  households.  f.  The  numbers  used  by  Hope  are  averages  of  previous  estimates  by 
Fankhauser  and  Tol;  Stern  et  al.  (2006)  [63]  adopted  the  work  of  Hope.  g.  Krugman  does  not 
explicitly endorse these figures but rather speaks highly of them on pdf page 8.  
5.1. Krugman 
Paul Krugman is arguably one of the more influential American economists given his long-running 
column in the New York Times. In 2010 he wrote an extensive summary of global climate economics 
for the New York Times Magazine [65]. Although not in academic format it is probably one of the most 
widely read articles on the subject to date. So it is worth examining it in some detail for the insight it 
may provide on economists‘ use of physical science information and the influence this has on the 
conclusions reached. 
Krugman‘s analysis [65] has a brief three-paragraph summary of his understanding of the physical 
science aspects. This is unusual and worthy of note since many other economists have either not tried 
to understand the physical science aspects or at least not reported having tried to do so. So he deserves 
credit for recognizing the  importance of these aspects.  He  did  not  provide  (reasonably, given  the 
magazine format), however, citations for his viewpoints, so it is unclear where he obtained his views. 
These views, however, do not ask the crucial questions concerning the consistency of the science with 
the scientific method emphasized in this article, but are nevertheless important to understanding his 
argument so are worthy of detailed analysis. His basic points [65] were as follows:  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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(1) There has been an upward trend in global temperatures since the 1970s, 
(2) ―Climate models predicted this well in advance, even getting the magnitude of the 
temperature rise roughly right.‖ This ―gives them enormous credibility.‖ 
(3) ―Models based on this research indicate that if we continue adding greenhouse gases to 
the atmosphere as we have, we will eventually face drastic changes in the climate.‖ 
My comments on these points are as follows: 
(1) Global temperatures have been trending upwards not just since the 1970s, but since the 
end of the Little Ice Age (see Figure 5 and Section 2.4.2), with what appears to be a 
superimposed  60-year  cycle.  So  this  upward  trend  existed  long  before  there  were 
significant anthropogenic GHG emissions, and the increases since the 1970s are hardly the 
most relevant observational data.  
(2) It is highly questionable whether the climate models used by the IPCC made any such 
predictions (see Figure 8, which shows the divergence between various IPCC scenarios 
shown  in  red,  orange,  and  brown,  with  the  actual  satellite  temperature  measurements 
adjusted to surface in blue and adjusted ground temperature data in green; see also the 
green  line  in  Figure  5).  And  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  climate  models  have  even 
managed to  correctly  hindcast temperatures  [4]. But even  if they did so  forecast,  who 
predicted what and when provides no valid scientific evidence about whether the models 
can predict the future. So again this is not the most relevant observational data. 
(3) It is probably true that the IPCC models will continue to produce such results. Whether 
they have any predictive capability, however, is highly dubious for the reasons discussed in 
Section 1.2.1 Krugman‘s views on the coming apocalypse, however, are of considerable 
importance because they appear to form the basis on which he bases his final conclusions 
in the article. 
So Krugman recognized the importance of the science, but appears not to have asked the crucial 
questions  necessary  to  validate  his  views  in  terms  of  whether  they  reflected  the  most  relevant 
observational data and the scientific method. 
In the remainder of his article, Krugman explains that economists have supported two different 
approaches  to  climate  change  mitigation.  He  characterizes  the  first  of  these  as  a  ―policy  ramp‖ 
approach  because  it  proposes  that  GHG  emissions  controls  should  start  slowly  and  eventually  be 
ramped-up to much higher levels that the proposers believe will provide adequate control to prevent 
CAGW.  (He  does  not  explain  why  this  approach  might  make  sense,  but  it  postpones  major 
expenditures so that the present discounted costs are much less.) He characterizes the second approach 
as a ―big-bang‖ approach in that emissions controls would initially be much nearer the levels that are 
thought to reduce emissions sufficiently to allegedly avoid CAGW. He then supports Weitzman‘s 
views (not referenced, but presumably [81]) concerning the difficulty that economics may have in 
analyzing programs that may have a low risk of uncertain but overwhelming impacts, and uses these 
concerns plus his own views concerning the importance and magnitude of these alleged CAGW effects 
of increasing atmospheric GHG levels to support the ―big bang‖ approach. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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Figure 8. HadCRUT3 and UAH versus IPCC model global surface warming. Source: [80], 
based on a graph prepared by Dr. John Christy. 
 
 
In other words, Krugman argues that because he has heard that there could be CAGW effects, it is 
worth disregarding the ―standard‖ ramp-up approach advocated by many economists who have studied 
the question and spending very large amounts immediately on climate change mitigation to avoid this 
low probability possibility because they could be catastrophic. This approach assumes, of course, that 
what  he  has  heard  as  to  CAGW  effects  is  of  sufficient  reliability  to  justify  such  early  and 
overwhelming  expenditures  without  careful  analysis.  As  discussed  in  Section  2.6.2,  however, 
application of the scientific method shows that the CSF is much less than assumed by the IPCC and 
may be in the range of 0.6 to 0.7 °C . This implies that CAGW effects are no more of a possibility now 
than they have been during the current Holocene period to date. But given the strong scientific case 
made in Section 2.3.1 above for low rather than high sensitivity, the scientific case for such outcomes 
disappears,  and  we  are  left  with  conventional  benefit-cost  analysis  as  a  basis  for  making  an  
economic decision. 
Presumably given his earlier comments his views that CAGW effects are a realistic possibility are 
based on the global climate models used by the IPCC. So without examining the extent to which these 
climate models represent an accurate representation of the climate system, he appears to be proposing 
that very large amounts be spent starting immediately because of the output from these models. This 
appears to be a triumph of climate scare fears over careful physical science and economic analysis.  
As discussed in Section 3 above, however, there exists an alternative approach to mitigation which 
would cost only a small fraction of the GHG emissions control approach, has a realistic possibility of 
actually controlling global climate change, and does not need to be implemented until actual CAGW Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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effects should become imminent, if they ever do, since unlike CO2 emissions reductions the effects of 
SRM on global temperatures appear within months rather than decades. If indeed, Krugman is so 
concerned about the risks posed by such effects, he could have suggested a wait and see approach 
using these alternative approaches as a safety net, which is clearly the low cost approach to avoiding 
possible CAGW effects. 
Although  Krugman  [65]  refers  to  Weitzman  (presumably  [81]),  Weitzman  recognizes  the 
possibility of using a geoengineering approach as a way to avoid the risks from less than likely CAGW 
effects. The principal costs are some early but much more affordable research to better understand 
which geoengineering approaches offer the best approaches, how it could best be implemented, and 
building an institutional structure that would facilitate its use [62].  
More  generally,  Krugman  takes  an  interest  in  the  relevant  science,  but  fails  to  ask  the  crucial 
questions  concerning  whether  his  scientific  understanding  corresponds  with  the  most  relevant 
observational data and the scientific method and whether there may be lower cost mitigation alternatives. 
5.2. Lomborg 
Lomborg [58] takes a somewhat different approach. He believes the climate models and that global 
warming will occur as they claim it will, but believes that there are other important problems that also 
need to be addressed in the world. He also has taken an interest in geoengineering and believes that it 
needs to be explored. So he is a moderate believer in the CAGW science, a strong believer that the 
costs of mitigation need to be reduced, primarily through a large tax-funded government research 
program, and that other alternatives need to be explored. So call him a moderate on the benefits of 
mitigation and a strong believer that costs can and need to be reduced if CO2 emissions are to be 
effectively reduced. 
The multidisciplinary approach taken by Lomborg on the cost side is consistent with that advocated 
here, but it appears that Lomborg did not use and may not have sought the critical climate science 
inputs on the benefits side such as those described in Section 2 above. He may also have overestimated 
the effectiveness of large government research efforts that are not very clearly focused on a particular 
promising technology. Clearly the Manhattan Project was successful in reaching its goals, but the same 
cannot be said for governmental efforts to carry out research on climate change/global warming [60]. 
In sum, Lomborg does not appear to question the science advanced by climate alarmists but does 
examine whether there are lower cost mitigation alternatives. 
5.3. Relation between Analysts’ Assumptions and Policy Recommendations 
Although there have been some economics-only disagreements with regard to the economics of 
CAGW, principally with regard to the best discount rate to use and how to best value the benefits and 
costs involved, it appears that the physical science inputs used and other assumptions are at least as 
important  in  determining  the  policy  recommendations  arrived  at.  This  article  has  emphasized  the 
importance of the CSF and CO2 residence time in the atmosphere, which in turn determine the extent 
of the likely CAGW effects of global warming, the cost of improving energy efficiency, and whether 
geoengineering approaches are regarded as valid alternatives to reductions in GHG emissions as a 
mitigation approach. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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What this suggests is the importance of carefully examining these physical science inputs and other 
assumptions in arriving at useful conclusions. It is only by doing this that the major  variables in 
reaching an economic conclusion with regard to proposed climate change mitigation measures can be 
fully understood and explained. At the risk of gross generalizations from limited data, Table 4 shows 
my assessment of how many of the economic analysts treated the major assumptions and their overall 
policy recommendations. Obviously there are exceptions to the generalizations included in the table 
which are not noted, particularly in the last column given the diversity of the other studies. And there 
will be disagreements as to my characterizations. But I believe that the table suggests the major policy 
variables that have been considered to date. Economists might find it useful to give greater attention to 
the major physical science assumptions in preparing detailed benefit and cost estimates. 
Table 4. Comparison of principal assumptions and recommendations by economic analysts. 
Assumption/Analyst 
Krugman  
[65] 
Lomborg 
[58] 
Government 
Reports [63,64] 
Carlin 
Most Others 
[66-78] 
Ultra-low discount rate  No  No 
Yes (0.1% [63], 
0.05% [64]) 
No  No 
Optimistic technology 
costs 
Assumes low 
costs—so yes 
No  Yes  No (Sec. 3.2)  Yes 
Energy efficiency 
research effective 
Not discussed  Yes  Yes  No (Sec. 3.2)  Not discussed 
Catastrophic threat high  Yes  No  Presumably  No (Sec. 2.5)  Varies 
High CSF  Presumably  Yes  Yes  No (Sec. 2.3)  Yes 
CO2 residence time  
in atmosphere  
Presumably  
long 
Presumably 
long 
Presumably  
long 
Short (Sec. 2.2 
& 2.6.1) 
Presumably  
long 
Critical examination  
of scientific validity 
No  No  No  Yes (Sec. 2)  No 
Geoengineering  
valid alternative 
Not discussed  Yes  Not discussed  Yes (Sec. 3.3)  Not discussed 
Principal policy 
recommendation  
and basis 
―Big bang‖ to 
reduce threat  
of CAGW 
Energy 
efficiency 
research to 
reduce costs 
―Big bang‖ to 
avoid ―dangerous‖ 
CO2 levels 
No action; 
geoengineering 
research  
(Sec. 3.3 & 4) 
―Policy ramp‖ to 
reduce discounted 
costs 
It appears that the conclusions from this analysis are substantially different from most previous such 
analyses for the reasons identified by this table. A major difference is the detailed review of some of 
the scientific and technical issues involved in this article. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Conclusions with Respect to the Economics of Climate Change Control 
By taking a multidisciplinary approach carefully considering what other disciplines have to say, 
insisting on using the most relevant observational data and the scientific method rather than depending 
on  assertions,  climate  model  outputs,  and  questionable  conclusions,  and  considering  lower  cost Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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alternatives to achieving the same benefits leads to substantially different economic conclusions than 
most previous economic analyses, including the following: 
 Athough there are significant uncertainties with regard to exactly what assumptions other 
economic analyses have made, a good case can be made that the economic benefits of 
reducing CO2 emissions may be about two orders of magnitude less than those previously 
estimated by most economists because the climate sensitivity factor (CSF) is much lower 
than assumed by the United Nations because feedback is negative rather than positive and 
the  effects  of  CO2  emissions  reductions  on  atmospheric  CO2  are  short  rather  than  
long lasting.  
 The costs of CO2 emissions reductions are very much higher than usually estimated 
because  of technological  and  implementation  problems  recently  identified. Attempts  to 
decrease  these  costs  by  a  greatly  expanded  government  funded  research  program  to 
encourage  technological  innovation  are  both  expensive  and  may  or  may  not  prove 
successful in reducing the technological problems. 
 Geoengineering such as solar radiation management is a controversial alternative to CO2 
emissions reductions that offers opportunities to greatly decrease these large costs, change 
global temperatures with far greater assurance of success, and eliminate the possibility of 
low  probability,  high  consequence  risks  of  rising  temperatures,  but  has  been  largely 
ignored by economists. The costs of this promising but so far not carefully researched and 
validated approach appear to be many orders of magnitude cheaper, albeit with possible 
new  and  also  little  researched  risks.  It  would,  however,  introduce  the  possibility  of 
unforeseen new risks, but these risks could be reduced with relatively low cost research if 
carried  out  before  any  implementation.  With  such  a  modest  research  program  a 
geoengineering option could provide an insurance policy against CAGW if that should 
ever  become  a  realistic  possibility.  This  approach  should  remove  concern  about  low 
probability, high  consequence events arising from increasing global temperatures since 
such SRM could be implemented extremely rapidly with adequate preparations, unlike 
(probably  futile)  attempts  to  reduce  atmospheric  CO2  levels  decades  in  advance,  as 
currently proposed by the UN and many Western governments. So there is no basis for 
taking any action currently to control climate change, but research on the implementation 
of geoengineering options such as SRM might be worthwhile. 
6.2. More General Conclusions with Respect to Carrying Out Economic Analyses of  
Environmental Mitigation 
Although  it  is  not  always  necessary  for  environmental  economists  to  understand  the  physical 
science aspects of the proposed environmental control measures proposed and to determine whether 
there  may  be  lower  cost  means  to  achieve  the  benefits  desired  from  the  proposed  mitigation,  it 
certainly  never  does  any  harm  and  in  most  cases  involving  multidisciplinary  issues  it  is  vital  if 
economists are to provide realistic and useful advice to decision makers. Some may object that in this 
specialized world economists should leave such matters to physical scientists since it is believed that 
they will know more about them. The danger, of course, is that economists may place their trust in Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2011, 8                 
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physical scientists who are either not sufficiently knowledgeable or have a prior bias towards particular 
physical science hypotheses or mitigation methods to the exclusion of others. What is needed on the 
part of economists is an inquiring and open mind, insistence on use of the most relevant observational 
data and the scientific method, and technical curiosity so as to determine whether there may be lower 
cost or more efficient alternative methods to achieve whatever the environmental control measures 
they are evaluating are supposed to achieve. Economists do not have to carry out the physical science 
research involved or invent the lower cost control measures, but they do need to recognize which 
research and control measures meet their needs in these respects and particularly which have been 
validated by use of the most relevant observational data and the scientific method. 
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